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Preface
The Revenue Watch Institute and Transparency International have cooperated in the Promoting 
Revenue Transparency project since 2007. Our objective is to promote good governance by improv-
ing awareness among governments, private and state-owned companies, experts and activists of the 
importance of revenue transparency in countries where oil, natural gas and minerals play a major 
role in the economy.
This project reflects the many efforts by civil society organizations to help those countries realize  
the benefits of their natural riches as well as minimize the potentially negative effects of extractive 
industries. These efforts included Save the Children’s report Beyond the Rhetoric in 2005. Further 
down this road, the growing awareness of the importance of extractive industries for developing 
countries led to the publication of the Transparency International Report on Revenue Transparency 
of Oil and Gas Companies in 2008. 
Thanks in large measure to the efforts of international civil society, transparency and accountability 
in the management of extractive resources have moved in the last decade to the forefront of the  
international, national and regional policy agendas. Proper governance of the extractive sector is now 
seen as critical to the economic success of resource-rich countries. Yet the absence of an objective  
set of revenue transparency benchmarks for governments hampers efforts to promote the account-
able, transparent and effective management of oil, gas and mineral revenues. 
The Revenue Watch Index is meant to address this gap and to complement previous transparency 
assessments covering corporations. It is also intended to be an important resource for activists and 
policymakers, to guide their efforts to achieve higher standards of transparency and accountability  
in the extractive sector.
The Revenue Watch Index is a tool for citizens, parliamentarians, civil society organizations, cor-
porations and the media to demand higher standards of disclosure and access to information from 
governments. Together with the companies’ report, this index forms part of a sustained, collaborative 
effort to develop sound indicators to measure transparency and to promote accountability and good 
governance in resource-rich countries. 
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Executive Summary
The Revenue Watch Index is the first attempt to measure and compare the information govern-
ments disclose about the oil, gas and mining industries, including payments to those governments, 
contracts, regulations and related data. The extractive sector plays a critical role in resource-rich 
countries and in the global economy. Petroleum and its derivates account for 15 percent of world 
trade, and resource-related sovereign wealth funds—with some $2 trillion in assets—are major 
players in global financial markets. Industrial economies depend heavily on imported minerals, and 
investment in extractives in developing countries is increasing dramatically. From 2000 through 
2008, mineral resources accounted for 24 percent of Africa’s GDP growth. Over the next 20 years, an 
estimated 90 percent of hydrocarbon production is expected to originate in developing countries. 
State-owned companies control approximately 80 percent of global hydrocarbon reserves. The quality 
of resource management in key countries affects the entire global economy. 
This index assesses 41 resource-rich countries that have almost half of the world’s population and 
are among the top producers of petroleum, gold, copper and diamonds. These include advanced 
industrial countries such as Norway and the United States as well as countries that rank among the 
world’s poorest despite being endowed with vast natural resources. Political economists have noted 
that states that rely on oil, gas and mineral revenues may be particularly prone to mismanagement, 
high-level corruption, authoritarianism and entrenched conflict. 
Revenue transparency is essential to confront challenges such as corruption and citizens’ mistrust 
of government management of resource wealth. Transparent, accountable management of natural 
resource revenues is fundamental to the successful development and stability of all oil-, gas- and 
mineral-producing countries.
a new Tool for an uncharted Field 
To measure revenue transparency, the Revenue Watch Index evaluates the availability of information 
covering seven key areas of natural resource management:  
•  access to resources: the availability of data detailing contracts and licensing terms and 
procedures, as well as the existing legal and regulatory mechanisms related to the accessibility  
of information. 
•  Generation of revenue: the availability of detailed information published by various government 
agencies on production and payments, as well as an assessment of its accessibility and frequency. 
•  institutional setting: the rules, roles and responsibilities of the main actors involved in the 
management of revenue generation, as well as the presence of internal controls and other checks.
•  state-owned companies: the availability of information regarding the governance structures of 
state-owned entities and the reporting practices related to their activities.
• natural resource funds: the rules governing the operation of funds and their reporting practices.
•  sub-national transfers: the laws that regulate revenue sharing among different levels of govern-
ment and the disclosure of information about revenue sharing.
•  extractive industry Transparency initiative (eiTi): the extent to which member countries have 
fulfilled EITI criteria (i.e. publication of EITI reports, independent payment audits and  
reconciliations, and information about payments and revenue from state-owned companies).
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Country scores are constructed as 
an average of the Revenue Watch 
Index’s transparency indicators. 
Countries are ranked according to 
their average score.
To learn more and download report 
data, go to: www.revenuewatch.org/
rwindex.
This Index assesses  
41 resource-rich  
countries that contain 
almost half of the 
world population  
and are among the  
top producers of  
petroleum, gold,  
copper and diamonds.
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Indicators were scored on a scale of 0 to 100, reflecting the variable availability of information to the 
public. The results were aggregated into a final Revenue Transparency score for each country. Based on 
the final results of the index, we identify three groups of countries, ranked according to their relative 
score out of a possible 100:
•   comprehensive revenue Transparency   (average score 67-100): countries in this group provide 
their citizens with substantial amounts of information about revenue from the extractive  
sector. Governments show strong reporting practices and tend to make available detailed or  
disaggregated data on the different areas of the extractive sector under their authority.  
•  partial revenue Transparency    (average score 34-66): countries in the middle category of the 
ranking provide their citizens with information about their revenue from the extractive sector,  
yet have important transparency gaps in one or more specific categories of the index.
•   scant revenue Transparency    (average score 0-33): countries in the bottom of the ranking 
disclose the least amount of information and have poor reporting practices across all the  
categories the index covers.
In addition, Legal and Regulatory Framework indicators provide information regarding the institutional 
context in which oil, gas and mineral industries operate in these countries. This section examines 
laws and regulations calling for disclosure and access to information or placing checks on discretion-
ary powers.
results: a mixed Global picture for revenue Transparency
1.   The Revenue Watch Index shows that the majority of countries examined by this report (29 out of 
41) provide limited public information on their natural resource sector. This lack of transparency 
undermines the ability of citizens to hold their governments to account for their performance in 
managing public resources.
2.   Azerbaijan, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Russia, Timor-
Leste and the United States provide relatively more information on production of minerals, 
hydrocarbons and their profits.
3.   Algeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Tanzania and Turkmenistan provide scarce or very little information on their revenue from oil, 
gas and mining.
4.   Contract transparency is rare among all the countries surveyed, with Colombia, Liberia, Peru, 
Timor-Leste and the United States being the only governments that publish their contracts (or 
leases) in full. Even in these cases, the information may be hard to find. Many governments do 
not disclose contracts even to their legislatures.   
  
The Way Forward
This index provides a detailed picture of the areas in which government efforts to increase trans-
parency are urgently needed. We find substantial room for improvement in virtually all the  
countries surveyed. 
The index results also suggest that claims regarding the need for confidentiality are without foun-
dation. The index shows that many countries disclose information that other governments shroud 
in secrecy. Information is a prerequisite for accountability; it is also an essential tool for effective 
management of a complex sector. The ability of countries with substantial mineral or hydrocarbon 
reserves to use these resources for development may be severely hindered by low transparency.
The Revenue Watch Institute (RWI) and Transparency International (TI) call on governments, civil soci-
ety, parliamentarians and companies to advance revenue transparency in order to improve management 
of oil, gas and mineral revenues and to promote accountable resource management for the public good.
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Introduction
Mineral and hydrocarbon wealth helped fuel the success of older industrial economies like Australia, 
Canada, Sweden and the United States. It has the potential to finance rapid economic progress in less 
developed mineral-rich countries. Even after the recent global financial meltdown, oil prices remain 
high, while metals such as gold continue to break historical records. This price surge has greatly 
increased investment as well as export revenues from the extractive sector in countries producing 
these commodities, nations that account for almost half of the world’s population.
1
Many of these oil, gas and mineral producers are among the world’s poorest nations, despite the 
promise of wealth generated by their extractive sectors. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the top 
ten oil and gas producers are projected to receive a cumulative $4 trillion of oil and gas royalties  
and taxes during 2007-2030. Angola and Nigeria will receive the vast majority of those revenues.
2
 
Oil and mineral producers such as DRC and Sudan are also some of the most politically unstable. 
Despite the promise of extractive resources, there is a common association of abundant petroleum 
and minerals with extremely poor economic performance, an increased likelihood of authoritarian 
regimes and, in some cases, a high propensity to armed conflicts.
3
The quality of governance plays a particularly critical role in extractive industries. Common to nearly 
all these countries is a constitutional norm designating subsoil natural resources as public assets 
belonging to the state. The revenues from oil, gas and mineral exploitation are therefore in principle 
managed in trust by the government on behalf of the population. It is reasonable to expect that public 
resource wealth be used to advance sustainable economic growth and long-term development.  
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), revenue derived from hydrocarbons and miner-
als accounted for an average of 40 percent of the total fiscal revenues generated by resource-rich 
countries during the 2000-07 period. However, in too many countries, citizens have little informa-
tion about the sector. Without access to information, the public has very limited influence on the 
decisions governments make to manage the extractive sector, the terms for extraction, or the use of 
the money flowing from minerals exploitation and sales.
1.1 Why create the revenue Watch index?
Revenue transparency is particularly important in countries that rely on oil, gas and mineral  
revenues for the majority of their income. These revenues are volatile and can change significantly, 
as demonstrated by the commodity price crash of 2008-2009. The complicated formulas by which 
governments collect revenue from extractive activities and the large sums at stake leave countries 
particularly vulnerable to mismanagement and corruption. Mistrust in government stewardship  
of resource wealth and/or grievances about its redistribution throughout society can also lead to  
entrenched conflict, as is the case in DRC and the Niger Delta. This occurs not only at the national 
level but also with regional and local governments that are often uninformed about how much  
revenue they are due when redistribution is practiced. They then do not always share information 
about the revenue they receive with local citizens. Transparency is necessary to address these chal-
lenges. Regular, comprehensive information on extractive sector revenues allows governments, 
legislatures and citizens to have an informed debate about the best way to manage and utilize those 
resources. Revenue transparency encourages public scrutiny of a sector where graft and mismanage-
ment can otherwise flourish behind closed doors. This is important no matter how institutionally 
1 “advanced” a country may be, as scandals within the U.S. extractive industries demonstrate.4 Finally, revenue transparency builds public trust in a government’s intentions to manage resource wealth in 
its citizens’ best interest.
The underlying assumption of this index is that transparent and accountable management of natural 
resource revenues is essential to the development and stability of all oil-, gas- and mineral-produc-
ing countries. Recent studies find that countries with greater public access to information have better 
governance scores and higher economic growth.
5
 Moreover, research shows that more transparent 
countries have better credit ratings, better fiscal discipline and less corruption.
6
 Further evidence has 
emerged that countries with less transparency have lower per capita gross domestic product (GDP), 
lower foreign direct investment and higher capital costs than more transparent countries.
7
Over the past decade, transparency in the extractive industries has gained attention, as demonstrated 
by the rapid growth of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the global Publish 
What You Pay (PWYP) civil society movement. The creation of an IMF Guide on Resource Revenue 
Transparency and the Natural Resource Charter as well as new programs of the United Nations, the 
World Bank, the African Union and others underscore growing interests in assisting resource-rich 
governments in improving their extractive sector governance.  
 
However, definitions of revenue transparency have yet to go beyond relatively narrow disclosures 
of data on payments made by companies and received by governments. This kind of disclosure is 
essential, but it is insufficient to monitor and improve the use of natural resource wealth for broad-
based development.
The Revenue Watch Index therefore broadens the definition of revenue transparency to include 
other relevant areas of the extractive sector. These include transparency in contracting and licensing 
procedures; legal framework; management of natural resource funds (NRFs); state-owned oil, gas and 
mining companies’ operations; and distribution of revenue to sub-national governments. 
The Revenue Watch Index uses this approach to measure and compare revenue transparency across 
a diverse group of oil-, gas- and mineral-producing countries. The goal of the index is to contribute 
to the good governance debate by providing a concrete and specific definition of what extractive 
sector transparency means. It creates a comparative analytic framework to begin assessing individual 
countries’ performances against best practices, as well as against their peers. The index provides civil 
society and parliaments with robust empirical data that can be used to critique their country’s per-
formance and demand higher standards of transparency and accountability in the extractive sector. 
This is the first effort to provide a comparative empirical assessment of how oil-, gas- and mineral-
producing countries perform with respect to the disclosure and public availability of information 
covering their extractive industries.
8
To view or download report data, including country-specific documents and information, go to 
www.revenuewatch.org/rwindex.
Recent studies  
find that countries 
with greater public 
access to information 
have better gover-
nance and higher 
economic growth.
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Methodology
For data-gathering purposes, the Revenue Watch Institute developed a detailed questionnaire to 
identify information about a government’s management of the extractive sector and define revenue 
transparency. This questionnaire is based on the standards put forward by EITI, the PWYP campaign 
and the IMF’s Guide on Revenue Transparency. 
The questionnaire assesses information that governments publish about the oil, gas and mining sector 
in a comprehensive manner. First, the questionnaire identifies a set of key documents published by 
governmental agencies that oversee extractive resources. These documents provide information about 
reporting practices and constitute a straightforward standard to compare different countries. Second, 
the questionnaire identifies publicly available information and institutional practices on a series of  
issues highlighted by international guidelines, experts and international campaigns on transparency. 
The questionnaire distinguishes transparency aspects from the legal and regulatory framework. The 
transparency component refers to whether governments publish information relevant to each of the 
seven categories, as well as how comprehensive it is and how frequently it is published. The legal and 
regulatory framework dimension refers to the laws, regulations and institutions that delineate roles 
and responsibilities in the extractive sector and provide assurances of integrity in relevant categories. 
The seven  
categories  
of the revenue  
Watch index
•  access to resources: availability of data 
detailing contracts and licensing procedures, 
as well as the existing legal and regulatory 
mechanisms related to the accessibility of 
information. 
•  Generation of revenue: the availability of 
detailed information published by various 
government agencies on production and  
payments as well as an assessment of its  
accessibility and periodicity.
•  institutional setting: the rules, roles and 
responsibilities of the main actors involved in 
the management of revenue generation, as 
well as the presence of internal controls and 
other checks.
•  state-owned companies (socs): the 
availability of information regarding the  
governance structures of state-owned  
entities and the reporting practices related  
to their activities.
•  natural resource funds: the rules governing 
the operation of funds and the availability  
of information regarding their functioning.
•  sub-national transfers: the laws that 
regulate resource revenue sharing between 
different administrative and political units 
and assess the existing reporting practices  
in this regard.
•  eiTi: examines the extent to which 
members have fulfilled EITI criteria (i.e.  
publication of EITI reports, independent  
payment audits and reconciliations, and  
information about payments and revenue 
from state-owned companies).
The index is based on the collection of information covering seven categories that represent key areas 
of natural resource governance: 
2
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available information, which we define as information that any and all citizens might be able to  
obtain on an official Internet website or through a request to the public authority issuing the docu-
ment (see “Key Documents”). If one or more of the key documents could be obtained only through 
means unavailable to the public, it was not taken into account in scoring the questionnaire. In 
addition, researchers conducted interviews, to the extent possible, with local experts, civil society 
activists and government officials to corroborate information, expand our sources of information and 
mitigate any technological or translation bias.
It is important to note that information published on Internet websites by governmental agencies is 
the main source of data for the index. This is because the purpose of the index is to test how much 
data governments make publicly available through channels easily accessible to citizens. All the 
governments in the survey maintain official websites and routinely publish relevant information 
on them. A preliminary test of our methodology in Angola, Ecuador, Gabon, Mexico, Norway, Peru 
and South Africa captured a significant percentage of relevant information from online sources and 
identified the agencies more commonly in charge of reporting.    
2.3 resource focus
The Revenue Watch Index includes 30 countries where oil and gas are produced and 11 where miner-
als are extracted. For the mineral producers, researchers sought to identify information covering 
the entire sector. However, while oil and gas are relatively standardized, mining is a complex sector 
producing numerous resources that have different metrics for calculating volume and value. 
Analysis is further complicated by the fact that some hydrocarbon-rich countries are also important 
mining countries. In order to make comparisons across diverse countries, this research concentrates 
on the resource that earns the most revenue for the government as defined by the IMF guide. This 
decision means that our results do not cover the totality of the extractive sector in every country. 
Nonetheless, our findings and conclusions are valid for the resources that contribute the most to the 
government’s fiscal income in the majority of countries reviewed here.
12
2.4 peer review
The research results were submitted to peer reviewers to verify the answers provided in each 
questionnaire. Every country questionnaire was reviewed by at least one expert.
13
 Most peer review-
ers were local experts familiar with the revenue transparency movement and with expertise on the 
specific country’s extractive sector. Reviewers provided comments, suggested changes, challenged 
interpretations, provided overlooked evidence and/or identified mistakes. The resulting question-
naire was then sent back to RWI, which confirmed that all peer reviewers’ comments followed 
the methodology and were consistent. All the comments were subsequently shared with the lead 
researchers, who responded to reviewers’ comments. If the reviewers’ evidence or suggestions led to 
changes in the answer choice for specific questions, researchers made changes and appropriate notes 
about any modification, mistake or correction. RWI staff checked for consistency of assumptions 
across countries when selecting scores and made final decisions on scoring. Finally, RWI collected 
information on the number of changes suggested by each reviewer and number of question scores 
changed after the reviewing process. We provide these as an indication of the discussions and the 
decision-making process behind the final calculations of the score (see Appendix 3). Peer review 
started in February 2010 and was completed by July 2010. The result of this process is an expert-based 
survey index, in which every answer is backed up by evidence as defined before. 
2.5 scoring and organization of results
As mentioned above, only transparency-related questions were factored into the Revenue Watch Index. 
The index follows the seven categories that compose the questionnaire: Category I Access to resources; 
Category II Generation of revenue; Category III Institutional setting; Category IV State-owned oil, gas 
Based on this questionnaire design, the Revenue Watch Index is constructed as a simple average of 
the transparency-related questions.
9
 The scoring of each question is based on whether a document, 
regular publication or online database provides the information demanded in the questionnaire.  
Using only this type of question allows the index to compare whether information exists in  
periodical reports and documents, a straightforward way of establishing standards across countries.
For the legal and regulatory framework component, we draw from standards identified by the IMF 
guide and the Natural Resource Charter, among others, to select practices that facilitate comprehen-
sive disclosure, offer greater access to information, or put a check on discretionary powers.
10
 The 
rationale for including these questions springs from the recognition that transparency alone does 
not address all the problems faced by resource-rich countries. However, standards and good practices 
are still emerging and evolving. In some cases, policy recommendations can become prescriptive.
11
 
Therefore, the index scores rely exclusively on transparency questions. 
Questions related to the legal and regulatory framework track the existence of rules and organiza-
tional features, but do not assess how they are functioning in practice. The questions are meant to 
help civil society and parliamentarians further evaluate domestic institutions and improve their 
performance. In a separate section of this report, we provide a brief analysis of the legal and regula-
tory framework features using the information researchers collected. The index does not score the 
legal and regulatory framework, and the information gathered through these questions is useful to 
provide context for the countries included in this report. 
2.1 country coverage
Country selection began with the 55 countries that the IMF defines as having economies dependent 
on oil, gas or minerals. In addition, we considered countries that participate in the EITI. At the  
time this project started, this included 30 countries, all but six of which are in the IMF definition.  
Finally, we identified five important producers of hydrocarbons and minerals that are among the top 
10 producers of mineral commodities, but did not fall in either of the two groupings (i.e. Australia,  
Brazil, Canada, China and the United States). These three categories produced a potential list of  
66 countries. 
For a balanced geographical selection, we identified six regions: (1) Africa, (2) Asia-Pacific, (3) Central 
Asia/Russia, (4) Latin America, (5) Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and (6) Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. From these, we selected a sample of 
41 countries out of the potential list of 66 for the first implementation of the Revenue Watch Index. 
Despite a nonrandom selection, the countries we analyze provide a balanced regional approach for 
comparative purposes. For this report, countries with a federal structure (e.g. Canada and Australia) 
were left out due to the challenges posed by the diverse nature of the authorities in charge of  
managing and taxing natural resources in terms of research and creating an aggregated score. 
2.2 research process
Independent consultants gathered the information to complete each country questionnaire from 
November 2009 to April 2010. Research concentrated on identifying publicly available information 
covering a period from January 2006 to December 2009. Reports published during this time but 
providing information prior to 2006 counted as historical data. A number of countries implementing 
the EITI produced new reports in 2010, and the disclosure of new information through such reports 
is likely to improve country scores in the next iteration of the index.
Each researcher covered countries within a particular region, of which they had expert knowledge 
(including relevant local languages) and prior work experience. Researchers filled in a detailed ques-
tionnaire for each country and provided evidence for their answers. Research was based on publicly 
Methodology
Researchers gathered 
the information from 
November 2009 to 
April 2010.
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and mining companies; Category V Natural resource funds; Category VI Sub-national transfers;  
and Category VII EITI. 
The most important section for the score is Category II on Generation of revenue, with 29 indicators, 
compared with 22 for all these other sections. The Revenue Watch Index questionnaire repeats five 
sets of questions covering information from the finance and extractive sector ministries, regula-
tory agencies, central banks and state-owned companies (or agencies performing relevant role in 
each case). This design stressed the need for comprehensive research of all the potential sources 
of information in every country. For the final score of this section in the Revenue Watch Index, we 
systematically chose the maximum value for each indicator from among the five available sets. This 
consolidated score avoids rewarding repetition of information and it forms the core of the index.
14
Indicators for Category II highlight crucial elements of a country’s fiscal system for the extractive sec-
tor; what types of payments governments receive for their oil, gas and minerals, and in what amount. 
The index captures all possible forms of payments, including royalties, special taxes, excise taxes, 
percentages of revenue share in production sharing agreements and others. 
Each question was scored on a scale of 0 to 100, reflecting the variable availability of information to 
the public.
15
 The final score is a simple average of all the values of the transparency-related questions. 
All questions (multiple-choice and yes/no questions) have a “not applicable” option as an answer. 
Scoring questions as “not applicable” was avoided in the index whenever possible. We used it only 
when the situation was truly not applicable, such as in response to questions about the existence of a 
state-owned company in a country that does not have one. If a question was scored “not applicable” 
by a researcher, the peer reviewer had to agree with the score, and RWI checked the evidence available 
before the score was final. “Not applicable” questions were dropped from the pool of questions used 
to determine a country’s score in the Revenue Watch Index.
topics should refer to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, the International 
Budget Partnership’s Open Budget Index (OBI), Global Integrity’s Global Integrity Report and the World 
Bank’s World Governance Indicators, among others. In contrast, this index provides a new measure for 
a specific sector that has been overlooked by comparative governance indicators until now.
In a similar vein, the index does not measure whether a country’s extractive sector effectively  
contributes to economic growth and development. Neither does it focus on the accuracy or com-
pleteness of the information disclosed and identified. Countries that may engage in unreported  
off-budget accounts would not be identified by the methodology followed in this study. Therefore, 
any claims on the basis of this research should be limited to the information we can support with  
primary documents and reports. Along these lines, future research for the index may test the  
reliability and accuracy of information that official sources provide, which could involve gathering 
quantitative data and cross-referencing with international or independent sources.
 
This index creates a baseline that enables country comparisons and provides a tool to assess whether 
and how countries are seizing opportunities to make their extractive sectors more transparent. The 
comparative nature of this index, as well as its specificity at the policy level, also provides a power-
ful tool for policy makers to assess their institutional performance and for local advocacy partners to 
articulate concrete areas in need of reform. 
No single measure can capture all the dimensions of a country’s institutional practice and governance. 
However, the Revenue Watch Index provides  the best information available under the assumptions 
and rules explained in the methodology. This index is not a comprehensive overview of a country’s 
governance—but it measures indicators for a specific sector that has been neglected until now.
•   comprehensive revenue Transparency 
(average score 67-100): countries in this 
group provide their citizens with substan-
tial amounts of information regarding the 
management of their extractive sector. Their 
governmental agencies and/or SOCs show 
strong reporting practices and tend to make 
available detailed or disaggregated data on 
the different areas under their authority. 
•   partial revenue Transparency   (average 
score 34-66): countries provide their citizens 
with information about the extractive sector 
yet show important transparency gaps in one 
or more specific categories of the index.
•   scant revenue Transparency   (average 
score 0-33): countries have the lowest levels 
of information disclosure and poor reporting 
practices all across the different categories 
that compose the index.
Based on the final results of the index, we identify three groups of countries, ranked according to 
their relative score out of a possible 100:
ranking the  
countries
Methodology
•  contracts or investment agreements: 
agreement between a state (or any of the 
authorized agencies acting on its behalf) and 
resource companies that regulate access to 
resources. These are normally published by the 
ministry of the extractive sector or the SOC.
•  environmental and social impact reports: 
assessments including information about the 
environmental and social impact of activities 
undertaken in the framework of the extractive 
sector. These tend to be published by the SOC 
or ministries of environmental protection.
•  statistical reports/databases: documents 
containing statistical information related to  
the extractive sector. In general, statistical  
reports are produced and published by the 
ministry of the extractive sector, statistical,  
and regulatory agencies or by the SOC.
•  annual and in-year reports: annual and/or 
quarterly or monthly documents describing 
the activities and operations of a country’s 
government with regards to the extractive 
industry. While these are usually published by 
the government agencies, in some countries 
the central bank also publishes reports on its 
activities regarding the extractive sector.
•  eiTi reports: documents containing data of 
revenue flows from oil, gas and mining activi-
ties of a country. Normally an independent 
EITI report administrator writes these, and 
the country’s multi-stakeholder group accepts 
them.
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•  auditor reports: either an annual report 
issued by the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) 
attesting to the government agencies’ year-
end final accounts and reports from internal 
or external audit agencies that provide 
audited financial statements for the SOC or 
other agencies managing resource revenue.
17
Using a similar standard as the International Budget Partnership (IBP)’s Open Budget Index, we 
define publicly available information as information that any and all citizens might be able to obtain 
through a request to the public authority issuing the document. During the information-gathering 
process, researchers inquired about the following documents:
Key documents
The results vary greatly among the countries included in the index, and the questionnaire is helpful 
in highlighting the specific areas where each country falls short of good practice. Therefore, even 
for countries with Comprehensive Revenue Transparency, a closer examination of their scores for 
specific indicators within each category demonstrates substantial room for improvement.
2.6 What the revenue Watch index does not cover
This index is not a measure of corruption or budget openness. There are other well-known and firmly 
established organizations that already produce reports on these issues. Readers interested in those 
12 13
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2.7 Key documents identified by research on the revenue Watch index
The research for this index identifies a host of valuable information and documents. Primary  
official documents are identified as “Key Documents,” and these are the main evidence on which  
the Revenue Watch Index bases its scores. Definition of these documents relies on the IMF guide,  
EITI and other relevant international standards.
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In addition to collecting key documents, the Revenue Watch Index research identifies the degree  
of public access to key documents governments provide. Table 1 summarizes this information.  
Documents provided by researchers are evidence of countries actually producing and distributing 
key documents to the public. Our inference for the other three categories in the table relies on inter-
views with local experts and input from peer reviewers. 
Table 1 demonstrates that contract transparency is very rare. Only five governments publish contracts 
on mineral resources in full. In contrast, annual and statistical reports from ministries of finance or 
oil and mining are fairly common. Regarding environmental and social impact reports, the majority 
of governments do not publish documents incorporating this type of information.
Methodology
Overall Results
The Revenue Watch Index shows that about three-quarters (29 out of 41) of the countries provide 
scant or partial information about their extractive sector. This means that citizens are missing  
essential information to know how much their governments are profiting from the exploitation  
of state-owned natural resources.
Table 2 (page 16) shows countries’ rankings and a breakdown by type of information of the Revenue 
Watch Index, followed by a more detailed description of each category.
3.1 comprehensive revenue Transparency
The 12 countries included in this category provide relatively comprehensive disaggregated disclosure 
of the revenue received by government agencies and/or state-owned companies. Countries in this 
group have an average score of 81 in the Revenue Watch Index and share some common features.  
Disclosure includes information on reserves, production volumes and value of production, compa-
nies operating in the country, and detailed information about the main payments to the government, 
such as royalties, taxes and special taxes, among others. The index research identified consistently 
strong reporting practices at their treasury, tax or statistical agencies. Multiple agencies provide  
detailed or disaggregated reporting on the different areas under their authority. In addition, several  
of the state-owned companies in these countries are publicly listed or partially listed, although 
maintaining preeminent state control, and therefore provide public reports for investors.
In this category Brazil comes on top of the ranking, slightly above Chile and Norway, both of which 
are also considered as models of good governance for oil, gas and mining. Kazakhstan and Russia  
appear in this category on account of reporting from tax and statistical agencies. Mexico exhibits 
comprehensive reporting by the ministries of Finance and Energy, and by its national oil company 
(NOC), which is fully state-owned but has successfully issued bonds in international and national  
securities markets for several years. For its part, Colombia has good reporting practices across agen-
cies in the sector. Peru has been a pioneer in adopting access to information and reporting practices 
in the region, progress reflected in its ranking. In the United States, the Minerals Management  
Services, regulates the sector and publishes the full text of active leases (contracts) and relevant  
information about payments.
21  
Finally, Timor-Leste has adopted high transparency standards as 
part of its state-building process.
Despite appearing at the top of the index, countries in this category still have substantial room for 
improvement. Progress in revenue transparency can be achieved by expanding the level of disag-
gregation to include all the payments, such as royalties, special taxes, bonuses, revenue share from 
production sharing contracts (PSCs) and other relevant fees the government receives from oil, gas 
and mining companies. Providing this information in easily accessible sources and formats would 
greatly facilitate disclosure and analysis. Improvements are also possible in opening SOCs’ opera-
tions to scrutiny and providing information on fiscal terms that governments negotiate with extrac-
tive companies, especially full disclosure of such contracts. Finally, implementation of EITI should 
be considered, as the Revenue Watch Index shows that the countries of this group already comply 
with the basic EITI disclosure criteria, and they could further benefit from international recognition 
stemming from the validation process. 
3
Countries in  
the top tier of the 
index still have  
substantial room  
for improvement.
TABLE 1 
Access To Key DocumenTs
countries producing 
and distributing 
documents to the 
public (e.g. in 
libraries, news- 
papers, online, etc.)
countries 
producing 
documents 
but making them 
available to 
the public only 
on request
countries 
producing 
documents for 
internal purposes, 
but not making 
them available 
to the public
countries not 
producing 
documents, even 
for internal 
purposes
Contracts
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5 4 21 3
Environmental  
and social impact 
reports
15 6 5 15
Statistical reports  
/ databases
38 0 0 3
Annual reports 39 0 0 2
In-year reports
20
30 1 1 8
EITI reports 18 0 0 23
Auditor reports 22 3 8 8
14 15
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The Revenue Watch Index is based on an average of 51 indicators, and not on an average of the seven categories scores shown  
here for analysis by type of information. To view or download report data, go to www.revenuewatch.org/rwindex.
3.2 partial revenue Transparency 
Twenty-one countries fall in this category with scores between 66-34 and a total average score of 48.5. 
Yet there is significant variance in disclosure of information practices among countries in this group. 
To highlight their diversity we distinguish three tiers: five countries with a score of more than  60, 11 
with a score between 59 and 41, and five with less than 40.
Among the countries in the highest section of this category we find Iraq, Liberia, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Venezuela and Yemen. Although Iraq and Yemen show above-average reporting on generation of 
revenue, they present low levels of disclosure about access to resources and state-owned companies. 
Liberia publishes extensive information through its EITI process. Trinidad and Tobago has good  
reporting capacity, but its score is brought down by no reporting on sub-national transfers. In the 
case of Venezuela, although reporting on revenue generation appears strong, concerns have arisen in 
the past about the quality of official data.
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 However, the Revenue Watch Index did not test the data 
to discount this factor, and we chose to take the publicly available information at face value. 
Eleven countries that differ substantially in terms of economic development, geographic location  
or political system belong to the middle tier of this category. South Africa and Botswana appear 
among the highest African countries included in this review, but with only average disclosure of 
information on revenue generation. Four out of 11 countries in this category are implementing EITI:  
Cameroon, Gabon, Nigeria and Zambia. However, they have an average or below-average perfor-
mance on the rest of the indicators. The remaining countries are Bolivia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Papua New Guinea, which show below-average scores for information for revenue generation. 
Five countries appear in the lowest tier of this group with uneven disclosure of information across 
the different categories. Two countries (Mongolia and Sierra Leone) are EITI members. Sudan, despite 
very low scores in most categories, shows some disclosure of information on revenue generation 
and on transfers of revenue to Southern Sudan.
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 Angola falls at the bottom of the category, with poor 
disclosure of information about its NOC and NRF. 
3.3 scant revenue Transparency
The common features within this group, which includes eight countries with an average score of 
23.6, are poor reporting on generation of revenue and low transparency on access to resources.  
Weak disclosure of information on those two sections brings down scores even for EITI participants 
such as DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana and Tanzania. Some countries like Ghana or Tanzania show 
above-average scores in some sections, like transparency of natural resource funds or institutional 
setting, but that does not compensate for poor or untimely disclosure of information on payments 
the government received in the sectors covered by this index. The other four countries in this  
category—Algeria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Turkmenistan—show no disclosure of information on 
the topics covered here, which is in line with their low rankings in other transparency measures such 
as the OBI.
Overall Results
Five countries 
appear in the lowest 
tier of this group  
with uneven disclo-
sure of information 
across the different 
categories. 
TABLE 2 
resulTs of The revenue wATch inDex By Type of informATion
country
1. 
access to 
resources
2. 
Generation 
of revenue
3. 
institutional 
setting
4. 
state-owned 
companies
5. 
 natural 
resource funds
6. 
subnational 
transfers
7. 
 
eiTi
revenue 
Watch index
Brazil 91.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 N/A 100.0 0.0 97.0
Norway 91.8 97.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 N/A 67.0 96.4
Russia 89.0 93.1 67.0 81.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 89.7
Mexico 83.3 79.0 100.0 94.5 91.8 100.0 0.0 83.4
Chile 66.7 84.0 100.0 95.3 91.8 53.2 0.0 80.6
Colombia 100.0 80.3 100.0 85.7 33.3 100.0 0.0 79.6
Kazakhstan 44.3 93.8 67.0 66.7 91.8 0.0 67.0 77.5
Peru 75.0 71.2 100.0 N/A N/A 100.0 67.0 76.8
Azerbaijan 33.3 76.3 33.0 77.8 100.0 N/A 100.0 75.1
Ecuador 58.3 76.0 100.0 76.1 N/A 80.0 0.0 73.6
United States 100.0 63.4 100.0 N/A 75.0 86.6 0.0 71.4
Timor-Leste 58.3 69.5 100.0 0.0 100.0 N/A 67.0 70.5
Iraq 41.8 68.0 67.0 50.0 91.8 60.0 33.0 63.8
Venezuela 11.0 70.7 100.0 71.6 33.3 73.2 0.0 63.0
Trinidad and Tobago 58.3 64.2 100.0 85.7 91.8 0.0 0.0 61.9
Yemen 33.3 70.5 67.0 38.8 N/A N/A 33.0 60.5
Liberia 75.0 63.8 67.0 N/A 0.0 N/A 100.0 60.5
South Africa 33.3 62.1 100.0 N/A N/A N/A 0.0 58.0
Bolivia 25.0 53.1 100.0 66.6 N/A 86.6 0.0 56.3
Papua New Guinea 66.8 51.3 100.0 71.4 0.0 20.0 0.0 51.1
Indonesia 58.3 52.4 67.0 33.3 N/A 60.0 0.0 50.0
Malaysia 11.0 64.1 33.0 33.3 100.0 0.0 0.0 48.4
Nigeria 25.0 47.4 67.0 52.3 0.0 80.0 67.0 46.5
Botswana 25.0 56.0 100.0 23.7 44.3 N/A 0.0 46.3
China 33.3 44.4 67.0 71.4 N/A 0.0 0.0 42.2
Gabon 25.0 49.2 67.0 N/A 41.8 0.0 67.0 41.8
Cameroon 58.3 46.0 67.0 57.1 0.0 0.0 67.0 41.8
Zambia 33.3 42.0 67.0 40.0 N/A N/A 33.0 41.2
Sierra Leone 41.5 39.1 100.0 N/A N/A 6.6 100.0 38.2
Mongolia 50.0 38.4 67.0 42.9 25.0 20.0 67.0 38.2
Sudan 0.0 36.6 0.0 26.6 50.0 86.6 0.0 37.4
Iran 44.3 43.2 33.0 42.7 16.5 6.6 0.0 36.1
Angola 41.8 44.4 67.0 38.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 34.7
Saudi Arabia 0.0 36.0 33.0 27.7 49.8 N/A 0.0 32.4
Ghana 25.0 33.3 67.0 100.0 0.0 N/A 67.0 32.3
Kuwait 0.0 30.3 33.0 51.6 25.0 N/A 0.0 29.8
Tanzania 25.0 27.8 100.0 16.7 N/A N/A 33.0 27.8
Algeria 25.0 23.8 33.0 42.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.8
DRC 11.0 13.8 100.0 66.7 N/A 20.0 67.0 22.5
Equatorial Guinea 41.8 12.3 67.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.6
Turkmenistan 0.0 16.7 33.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.7
average 44.8 53.9 74.0 54.3 46.3 45.2 26.9 51.8
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Results by Category
4.1 access to resources
Low scores in this category indicate that countries do not provide their citizens with access to in-
formation nor public disclosure of major investment agreements in the oil, gas and mineral sector. 
In keeping with the findings of RWI’s 2009 report Contracts Confidential, the Revenue Watch Index 
shows that licensing processes, social and environmental impact assessments, and contracts often 
remain beyond public scrutiny.
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The findings also demonstrate that contract transparency is rare. Among the countries surveyed, 
only Colombia, Liberia, Peru, Timor-Leste and the United States publish their valid contracts in full.
25
 
There is a danger that contract transparency can be reversed easily too. For example, in early 2010 
Bolivia took down the government web page where contracts were previously disclosed. In some 
cases, contracts are published by the operating companies but not the government, as demonstrated 
in Azerbaijan where operating companies have published these agreements. 
In numerous countries that perform poorly on the index, such as Equatorial Guinea, Sudan and  
Turkmenistan, governments do not even disclose contracts to their legislatures. Also, most countries 
lack rules or legislation providing citizens with a right to information about their country’s extrac-
tive industries. Notably, the worst performers in terms of freedom of information are the most highly 
resource-dependent countries, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Sudan, where the vast majority  
of public revenue comes directly from the oil, gas and/or mining sectors. The situation is even  
more striking when considering that only 12 of the countries surveyed have adopted legislation to 
protect freedom of information and guarantee access to public information; eight of these are in the 
Western Hemisphere.
Information about licensing procedures is more commonly disclosed than contracts, and 22 coun-
tries—almost all of them rich in petroleum—publish some information on this topic. The primary 
reason for this is that auctions have become widespread as means to allocate exploration and pro-
duction rights in the hydrocarbon sector, as well as to identify service providers. On the other hand, 
the majority of mining countries surveyed by the index follow the “first-come, first-served” principle 
to allocate license rights. This process is less transparent than an auction, even if clearly established 
and predictable in the mining legislation.
Another important issue here is the publication of environmental and social impact reports by 
governments. Only 15 countries reviewed here (nine hydrocarbon and six mining countries) publish 
some assessment of environmental and social impacts. In some cases, these take the form of corpo-
rate social responsibility reports by state-owned companies. The diversity of practices identified by 
this index demonstrates the importance of further research on how governments report information 
on environmental issues, given that a global standard regarding production and publication of these 
reports is still emerging.
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4.2 Generation of revenue27
A detailed analysis of the type of information that countries publish shows that governments are 
more likely to disclose operational rather than financial information. Countries such as Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Norway and the United States get the highest marks when it comes to publishing 
information on reserves, production volumes, prices, exports, investment, costs, companies operat-
ing in the country and disaggregated production volumes. The total average score for this section is 
67.7, and the minimum score for this topic is 25.8 (Table 3).
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On the other hand, disaggregated information about financial payments received by governments, 
such as profit shares in PSCs or royalties, special taxes, dividends, bonuses and extraction fees are 
less likely to be disclosed. The average score for all the countries is 46.7, and six countries do not 
publish this type of information. 
One reason why data on operations is more commonly disclosed is that governments often see it as a 
way to promote investment in the country. Publishing information on the country’s reserves and pro-
duction, as well as on total investment amounts, is an indication of future production capacity and 
also of ability to meet financial commitments. A second reason for disclosure of operations informa-
tion is a trend for governments to turn their state-owned companies, especially in the hydrocarbon 
sector, into ones that are publicly or partially traded, or at least that issue bonds in stock and securi-
ties markets. State-owned (or controlled) companies from Brazil, Kazakhstan, Mexico and Russia are 
examples of these arrangements. Increased engagement with financial markets brings state-owned 
companies under the obligation to disclose substantial information on their operations and financial 
standing for investors.
Financial information is crucial to identify payments received by countries for the exploitation of 
their resources. This is a necessary step before turning attention to the use of profits from oil and 
mining. As the EITI and PWYP insist, this is a crucial aspect of accountability, and governments 
should commit to good practices of reporting and disclosure of information, including details on 
each type of payment they receive from the extractive sector. 
The generation of revenue section also evaluates the quality and frequency of reporting. Quality 
of reporting is defined as whether reports are comprehensive and understandable, and periodicity 
relates to how often those reports are released. Overall, the results by governmental agency show 
notable differences in these categories (Table 4).
Results by Category
To view or download report data, including country-specific documents and information, go to www.revenuewatch.org/rwindex.
One reason why 
data on reserves and 
production volumes 
is more commonly 
disclosed is that  
governments often 
see it as a way to 
promote investment 
in the country.
TABLE 3 
cATegory ii scores – generATion of revenue By Type of informATion reporTeD
TABLE 4 
quAliTy AnD frequency of reporT scores
agency periodicity Quality of report average
Central bank 68.4 68.5 68.4
Ministry of extractive sector 36.3 45.8 41.3
Ministry of finance 59.4 58.8 59.1
Regulatory agency 29.6 31.0 30.3
State-owned company 41.0 56.3 48.7
average 48.6 53.3 51.0
country Financial operations
Norway 100.0 100.0
Brazil 100.0 100.0
Kazakhstan 100.0 100.0
Russia 95.9 92.7
Chile 75.0 100.0
Azerbaijan 95.9 70.6
United States 66.8 88.9
Colombia 58.4 100.0
Venezuela 62.5 88.9
Yemen 77.8 66.7
Trinidad and Tobago 54.3 85.2
Mexico 37.5 100.0
Iraq 62.5 77.8
Liberia 71.0 66.7
Timor-Leste 77.8 51.9
Malaysia 55.6 74.1
Ecuador 50.0 77.8
Peru 33.3 88.9
Iran 50.0 66.7
Bolivia 45.9 70.3
Cameroon 33.0 77.8
Indonesia 26.0 85.2
Gabon 41.5 66.7
Botswana 37.5 66.7
Nigeria 37.5 66.7
Angola 29.1 70.4
China 44.4 55.6
South Africa 57.1 44.3
Zambia 33.4 55.6
Mongolia 57.0 33.4
Sierra Leone 41.6 40.8
Papua New Guinea 33.3 48.1
Ghana 38.8 33.3
Saudi Arabia 0.0 66.7
Tanzania 0.0 59.3
Kuwait 18.5 44.3
Sudan 0.0 55.6
Algeria 16.5 33.1
Turkmenistan 0.0 44.6
Equatorial Guinea 0.0 29.6
DRC 0.0 25.8
average 46.7 67.7
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In total, 14 countries have SOCs that publish full reports on their operations that include balance 
sheet and profit and loss statements; two publish reports that include data on revenues, taxes and net 
income; and eight publish information on operations but without disaggregated details. SOCs in 14 
countries publish audited reports. Also, 22 governments publish information on joint ventures or eq-
uity participation with private resource companies. Some examples are Brazil, Colombia and Norway, 
all with publicly traded oil companies, while Chile, Kazakhstan, Mexico and Russia’s companies pub-
lish investor’s reports. In one case—that of Ecuador—the NOC is subject to a freedom of information 
law that requires extensive reporting on subjects such as contracting, procurement and expenditures.
A key area of concern within this category is the disclosure of information on quasi-fiscal activities. 
The index found that only 10 countries publish some data on how their national oil companies  
spend oil revenue on public and social projects. Lack of transparency emerges when countries use 
state-owned companies for projects without accountability, placing them outside normal legislative  
approval process and thus making them susceptible to manipulation. Venezuela’s PDVSA is an exam-
ple of an SOC whose information was in the past questioned by international and national experts.
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Other examples come from companies that have listed only partial areas of their operations that 
may not include exploration and production, as in the case of Kazakhstan’s KazmunayGaz. In such 
examples, disclosure of information may not represent the entire range of ownership and interests  
of governments. 
 
4.5 natural resource funds (nrFs)
Sovereign wealth funds (SWF) have attracted attention in recent years as the financial vehicle of 
choice for governments flush from unprecedented economic growth and the commodity price boom. 
NRFs are a sub-category of SWF, and the Revenue Watch Index considers only those funds specially 
designated to capture some share of oil, gas and mineral revenue. The purposes of the NRFs identi-
fied by this index are very diverse. They include intergenerational savings and stabilization funds, 
investment corporations and other arrangements that function as escrow accounts to transfer 
extractive revenues for several purposes that range from budget financing to development proj-
ects. The amounts that each fund manages also vary. Some examples include Iran and Mexico’s oil 
stabilization funds, Kuwait’s Investment Corporation, Norway’s Pension Fund Global, Timor-Leste’s 
Petroleum Fund and even the U.S. Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF).
32
 Overall, 29 countries 
reviewed have some form of natural resources account.
Fifteen of the funds covered in the index publish some information on their assets and transactions. 
Timor-Leste’s Petroleum Fund, for instance, publishes annual audited reports and quarterly state-
ments, including a version in the local language (Tetum). In 10 cases, the authority in charge of the 
fund publishes audited reports at least once every year. The results of this section provide a glimpse 
only of whether countries publish the rules for their funds’ operations, as well as periodic reports 
with audited information on assets and transactions. Readers interested in a more comprehensive 
picture of how resource-rich governments manage their oil, gas and mineral revenues should refer to 
the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) related to SWF governance (also known as the 
Santiago Principles), or to more specialized studies, such as the Peterson Institute of International 
Economics’ Index for Sovereign Wealth Funds.
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4.6 sub-national transfers
This section assesses information published by governments on how revenue from oil, gas and  
minerals may be shared between central/federal governments and regional/local administrations.
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The Revenue Watch Index shows that among the 29 countries where sub-national transfers are relevant, 
only 13 governments publish information on transfers of resource revenue to sub-national admin-
istrations. Whether sub-national governments disclose information on their receipts of extractive 
Central banks commonly report information related to value of mineral exports, sector activities 
and prices. Although these topics are important for transparency of revenue, they are not the most 
relevant. Ministries of finance have a more relevant role in managing revenue from the extractive 
industries, and this research demonstrates that they are often in charge of providing information. 
Despite this mandate, they could improve the timeliness, periodicity, and comprehensiveness with 
which they report information on payments received from oil, gas and mining companies. Mean-
while, state-owned companies, ministries for the extractive sector and regulatory agencies on aver-
age publish less information less regularly and of lower quality. A problem commonly observed with 
these agencies is that reports are often published with considerable time lags and without normal 
periodic updates. In other words, the agencies most directly concerned with extractive industries 
have the worst reporting practices.
4.3 institutional setting
This type of information refers to whether governments publish detailed legislation for their oil, 
gas and mining sectors. Although the existence of clear rules and a predictable legal framework is 
important for good governance of the extractive industries, this research did not test how a country’s 
legislation is implemented in practice. This is an important area for future research, particularly for 
civil society at the local level. For purposes of this index, high scores in this section may testify more 
to countries’ aspirations than to reality. 
Many countries at the bottom of the Revenue Watch Index get a very high score in this section. This 
should remind readers that legislation alone is not a perfect indicator of actual implementation  
and enforcement. Rules about management of the oil, gas and mining sectors do not translate into 
disclosure of contracts, financial or operational data.
4.4 state-owned oil, gas and mining companies
SOCs operate in 28 out of the 30 hydrocarbon-producing countries reviewed in this report and in 
seven out of nine mining countries. Only the United States has no ownership interest in corporations 
related to exploration and production of oil, gas and minerals, while Gabon has officially announced  
its intention to create a NOC.
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 A few other countries have no responses in this section because of our 
concentration on a specific area of their mineral sector, but their governments certainly hold owner-
ship rights in mineral-producing corporations.
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state-owned  
companies (socs)
SOCs differ both in the levels of state participa-
tion in their ownership structure as well as in 
their degree of exposure to international stock 
exchange listings. In the case of oil and gas, 
only Brazil, China, Colombia, Norway and Russia 
have national companies with partial private 
ownership. At the same time, StatoilHydro 
(Norway), Petrobras (Brazil), Ecopetrol (Colom-
bia) and Gazprom and Rosneft (Russia) are the 
only SOCs listed on major international stock 
exchanges (New York and London). 
Some countries list specific parts of their 
companies. For example, China has only listed 
subsidiary companies but not the parents. 
Kazakhstan is in a similar situation, as well as 
Malaysia, which has listed subsidiary compa-
nies but not the upstream sector or the holding 
company. Moreover, certain SOCs have tried to 
improve their corporate practices and issue debt 
bonds in the international securities market but 
are not listed, such as Mexico’s SOC.
As for the mining sector, SOCs are also generally 
fully owned by the governments of their respec-
tive countries, with Botswana, DRC and Zambia 
being the only countries that have opened their 
national mining companies to partial private 
ownership. Moreover, the national mining com-
pany of Zambia seems to be the only one that 
is listed on major international stock exchanges 
(London and Paris).
Results by Category
The index found that 
only 10 countries 
publish some data on 
how their national oil 
companies spend oil 
revenue on public  
and social projects. 
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The extractive  
industries  
Transparency  
initiative (eiTi)
From the information gathered for the Revenue 
Watch Index, we identify some countries that 
have a strong EITI performance regarding trans-
parency criteria but fail on the test of revenue 
transparency (see Table 5). Countries such as 
DRC, Mongolia and Nigeria need to improve 
access to information despite a relatively high 
level of compliance with EITI criteria. The large 
discrepancy between EITI implementation and 
revenue transparency scores highlights the fact 
that in these countries EITI provides essential 
information to citizens that governments are 
not providing elsewhere. This is a reminder both 
of the importance of EITI in these countries as 
the only initiative to open the government to 
public scrutiny and of the need to go beyond its 
implementation to improve levels of informa-
tion disclosure. In such countries, despite strong 
transparency through the EITI process, govern-
ments still need to provide comprehensive, 
periodic and timely reports to their citizens.
One example is Nigeria, which has produced 
two EITI reports covering the fiscal years 1999-
2004 and 2005. These are the only documents 
that make information publicly available for 
many ministries in charge of managing the 
sector in Nigeria. Furthermore, EITI reports suf-
fer from serious delays, and there is no source 
of comprehensive information after the year 
2005. The same can be said about Cameroon 
and Ghana. This is a reminder that governments 
need to improve timeliness of their reporting 
practices and make disclosure of information a 
sustainable process instead of a one-time event. 
Countries like Cameroon and Gabon perform 
relatively better at implementing EITI trans-
parency criteria than on their overall revenue 
transparency. However, Revenue Watch Index 
research finds that these countries have room 
for improvement even within EITI, reflecting 
criticism from local civil society that EITI reports 
in these two countries are superficial and  
insufficient for genuinely increasing levels of oil 
sector transparency and accountability.
35
 Despite 
publishing an EITI report, both countries are 
close to the bottom on the Revenue Watch 
Index. Other significant cases in this respect 
are Liberia and Sierra Leone, which despite 
performing well on EITI implementation, 
display average revenue transparency scores. 
In Liberia’s case, the EITI report is remarkably 
comprehensive and constitutes an example of 
good practice for this initiative. 
Kazakhstan and Norway have similar levels of 
EITI transparency criteria implementation and 
revenue transparency. However, a closer look 
at section scores offers room for improvement. 
For instance, these countries could improve 
their levels of disclosure on contract and 
license transparency (in both cases), as well as 
disaggregated revenue reporting and access to 
resources (in the case of Kazakhstan). 
At the time of writing this, Tanzania, Yemen and 
Zambia had yet to publish EITI reports. Moving 
forward with this initiative should improve their 
levels of revenue transparency.
Finally, for EITI implementing countries, the in-
dex’s results present evidence that the process 
has to be the beginning of reform, not an end in 
itself. Regular, periodical, timely and compre-
hensive disclosure of information has to be the 
standard, and EITI should not be an excuse for 
poor scores on this index.
revenue is equally important. Although information is scarce, we were able to identify 10 countries 
where at least one local administration publishes some information on the transfers they receive from 
central governments. RWI projects at the sub-national level in Ghana, Indonesia, Nigeria and Peru are 
examples of how local governments are starting to take a proactive stance on these issues.
However, almost all the countries in the Scant Revenue Transparency group do not provide informa-
tion on how their governments share revenue with local governments (even discounting those that 
are unitary states). The lack of information about transfers creates problems for sub-national govern-
ments to predict available resources and do effective planning.
4.7 eiTi
EITI countries spread across the whole spectrum of the Revenue Transparency Index. Four appear 
in the Comprehensive Revenue Transparency group; 10 rank in the Partial Revenue Transparency 
category and four in the lowest sector of this index (Scant Revenue Transparency). 
Participation in EITI, assessing their status in the initiative, was the only indicator included in the 
Revenue Transparency Index scores. However, research for the index also considered the implemen-
tation of other EITI criteria. These refer to whether a country is an EITI candidate country and has 
published an EITI report, and whether such a report includes audited payments and information 
from state-owned companies and has been reconciled by an independent administrator. At the time 
of research (November 2009-April 2010) the EITI validation process was ongoing, and certain coun-
tries (such as Equatorial Guinea) have since lost their EITI status, while others (Iraq) became candi-
dates. Although the Revenue Transparency Index does not measure whether countries have complied 
with EITI criteria, this report presents a score of this implementation in Table 5. This is neither an 
assessment of the EITI process nor a substitute for validation in these countries.
Results by Category
TABLE 5 
revenue wATch inDex scores of eiTi counTries
Participation in  
EITI, assessing their 
status in the initia-
tive, was the only  
indicator included  
in the Revenue 
Transparency Index.
country eiTi criteria implementation revenue Watch index
Norway 86.8 96.4
Kazakhstan 66.6 77.5
Peru 80.2 76.8
Azerbaijan 86.8 75.1
Timor-Leste 91.8 70.5
Iraq 16.5 63.8
Yemen 16.5 60.5
Liberia 83.3 60.5
Nigeria 86.8 46.5
Gabon 53.4 41.8
Cameroon 60.0 41.8
Zambia 16.5 41.2
Sierra Leone 83.3 38.2
Mongolia 80.2 38.2
Ghana 91.8 32.3
Tanzania 16.5 27.8
DRC 66.6 22.5
Equatorial Guinea 66.6 11.6
average 70.3 50.6
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Revenue Watch Index
Rankings are based on the availability of information in seven key categories of natural  
resource governance. To view or download report data and additional country-specific  
information, go to www.revenuewatch.org/rwindex.
Generation of revenue
Information on government payments
received and other revenues from all 
extractive activities.
natural resource Funds
Information on structure, regula- 
tion and finances of national  
funds designed to save natural  
resource revenues.
state-owned companies
Information on operation, govern- 
ance and finances of oil, gas  
and mining companies controlled  
by the national government.
access to resources
Information on natural resource  
reserves and composition of  
a country’s extractive sector.
institutional setting
Information on the laws, regulations 
and administrative rules that govern 
the oil, gas and mining sectors.
sub-national Transfers
Information on the transfer of natural 
resource revenues from the federal 
level to local and sub-national  
governments and communities.
eiTi
Status and/or progress of countries 
in the Extractive Industries Trans- 
parency Initiative, a voluntary  
standard for reporting and cross-
sector cooperation.
Sudan 37.4
Tanzania 27.8
DRC 22.5
Algeria 22.8
Nigeria 46.5
Cameroon 41.8
Eq. Guinea 11.6
Gabon 41.8
Ghana 32.3
Sierra Leone 38.2
Liberia 60.5
Angola 34.7
Zambia 41.2
Botswana 46.3
South Africa 58.0
96.4 Norway
63.8 Iraq
32.4 Saudia Arabia
36.1 Iran
29.8 Kuwait
60.5 Yemen
71.4 United States
83.4 Mexico
63.0 Venezuela
79.6 Colombia
61.9 Trinidad & Tobago
73.6 Ecuador
97.0 Brazil 
76.8 Peru
56.3 Bolivia
80.6 Chile
89.7 Russia
75.1 Azerbaijan
77.5 Kazakhstan
  9.7 Turkmenistan
38.2 Mongolia
42.2 China
48.4 Malaysia
50.0 Indonesia
70.5 Timor-Leste
51.1  Papua New  
Guinea
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Legal and Regulatory Framework  
For the legal and regulatory framework, the project identifies de jure rules on the management of  
the oil, gas and mineral industries. This research does not test the actual implementation of the legal 
and regulatory frameworks at the country level. However, the questions do provide important con-
textual information in three categories (Access to resources, Institutional setting and State-owned 
oil, gas and mining companies). Legal and regulatory framework questions inquire about the licens-
ing processes countries follow to grant access to resources, whether they have agencies in charge of 
licensing that are separate from operating companies, and what checks exist on the authorities that 
negotiate access to resources. 
Many countries have adopted competitive auction rounds for different aspects of exploration and 
production of oil and gas, from assigning licenses or production sharing agreements, to choosing 
service agreement partners or picking the best deal in service procurement. Algeria, Angola and 
Mexico offer examples of these varying approaches. Other governments have created complex sec-
tors with differentiated rules to access oil, gas and mineral reserves, which leave room for arbitrary 
decisions, conflict of interest and opacity of rules, such as Bolivia, Cameroon, Ecuador and Venezu-
ela. Finally, in some countries such as Equatorial Guinea and Turkmenistan, decisions as to which 
companies win access to reserves have been left to the discretion of the chief executive’s office. 
Country performance varies widely in having checks on discretionary decisions regarding the award 
of licenses. Almost half the countries included in the report have legislation that limits deviations 
from key principles or renegotiations after auction rounds or that requires approval of another inde-
pendent authority for decisions with potential effects on fiscal or regulatory principles. 
Nine countries also have rules requiring parliamentary ratification of oil, gas and mining contracts. 
However, in practice these rules do not necessarily guarantee improvements in revenue transpar-
ency, as evidenced by Bolivia, Ghana, Iran, Kuwait, Mongolia, South Africa, Venezuela and Yemen. 
Despite such parliamentary oversight, these countries do not provide comprehensive information 
about the rules governing access to resources. This is another example of the divide between de facto 
and de jure regulatory framework. Future research could examine how the implementation of laws 
affects de facto governance, as well as the availability and quality of information.
5
licensing  
procedures
Countries ranked by the Revenue Watch Index 
diverge in the way governments award licenses 
to exploit natural resources. While most of the 
countries tend to use licensing procedures, 
others—including Kuwait, Mexico and Saudi 
Arabia—do not rely on this method. Some of 
the countries with the highest dependency on 
oil, gas and mineral revenues have national 
companies with monopolies on access to the 
sector, or let these companies manage the 
licensing procedure, including Angola, Iran, 
Kuwait, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Turk-
menistan. Other states rely on their respective 
ministries of the extractive sector to lead the 
process, as has been the case recently in Algeria 
and Venezuela.
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 Finally, in the case of Nigeria, 
recent licensing procedures are managed by its 
regulatory agency.
Notably, Ghana, Mongolia and South Africa provide abundant information about their legal and 
regulatory framework, but they are not among the top peformers in the Revenue Watch Index. In 
these cases it appears that the existence of independent licensing agencies and operating companies, 
competitive licensing processes, limits on discretionary powers and legislative approval of contracts 
in the mining sector still has to translate into comprehensive disclosure of information to the public. 
Research on the legal and regulatory framework also included questions about the separation of roles 
and authorities in the management of the extractive sector. The existence of internal and external 
controls for agencies receiving payments from resource companies was considered too, as well as 
features of auditing practices and the extent of parliamentary and civil society oversight. 
Brazil, Colombia and Norway show strong legal and regulatory frameworks that model good practices 
through their separation of roles and authority across different agencies. According to this model, fis-
cal policy and tax collection is the finance ministry’s domain, an autonomous agency regulates and 
sets policy for the extractive sector, and a state-owned company is in charge of purely commercial 
activities. The existence of autonomous regulatory agencies overseeing exploration and production 
of hydrocarbons with relatively strong tax systems and publicly listed yet state-controlled companies 
creates multiple sources of information on these countries’ extractive sectors, which reflects strong 
disclosure of information. They therefore provide examples of strong legal and regulatory structures 
that, when implemented effectively, can enhance extractive sector transparency.
challenges of  
exporting the  
norwegian model  
of state-noc  
structure
The organization of Norway’s petroleum sector 
according to a formal separation of roles and 
powers—between a ministry in charge of policy 
formulation, an independent regulatory body 
in charge of monitoring and oversight, and a 
NOC with purely commercial functions—is often 
considered an international good practice. The 
success of the Norwegian model has inspired 
countries like Brazil to undertake energy sector 
reforms along these lines.
However, attempts to apply this model in 
Algeria and Nigeria stalled as reform faced 
resistance. Meanwhile, countries like Angola 
and Malaysia have been able to build up highly 
functioning oil industries in the absence of 
a separation. Recent research suggests that 
while the Norwegian model may represent the 
best structure for many places, countries with 
extremely low institutional capacity or little 
history of formalized checks and balances may 
be better served by a second-best approach 
that does not try to simultaneously build and 
empower three institutions at once, but rather 
seeks to embed accountability incrementally, 
through mechanisms such as public reporting 
requirements and oversight boards.
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 The Rev-
enue Watch Index treats the Norwegian model 
as good practice for state-NOC relations, but 
future versions will continue to track emerging 
analysis of its effectiveness globally.
Formal separation of powers, however, does not on its own reflect an effective system of checks 
and balances. The information from legal and regulatory framework questions shows that some of 
the best performers in terms of disclosure of information have an institutional setting that clearly 
separates roles and authority in the management of their extractive sector. However, countries such 
as DRC, Equatorial Guinea or Ghana that have adopted laws establishing a separation of roles and 
accountability mechanisms still provide scant information on how the government collects revenues 
from the extractive sector. 
State-owned companies’ questions refer to whether these companies follow internationally recog-
nized accounting standards and whether audits cover all SOC subsidiaries. Notably, state-owned 
companies that are also publicly listed (or partially listed) comply with these practices. This is the 
case of companies from Brazil, Chile and Norway, which are countries that appear in the Compre-
hensive Revenue Transparency category. However, adopting internationally recognized accounting 
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standards and publishing audited reports are not circumscribed to publicly listed companies, as 
demonstrated by fully state-owned companies in Malaysia and Mexico.  
One element highlighted during the research for the Revenue Watch Index is the difficulty in iden- 
tifying accounting standards. In this research, we consider that state-owned companies use inter- 
nationally recognized accounting standards when audits are performed by recognized accounting 
firms and when audit reports state the standards followed, either international financial reporting 
standards or generally accepted accounting principles. Under that assumption, companies in  
19 countries follow internationally recognized accounting standards, but there are still 10 countries 
where state-owned companies need to improve their accounting practices. Strong action on that 
front is necessary when considering that some of those countries do not publish audited reports 
either, as is the case with companies from Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Turk-
menistan, Yemen and Zambia. 
Legal and  
Regulatory Framework
Results by Region 
 
Regional averages of the Revenue Watch Index show a significant geographical variance. The region 
with the lowest scores is sub-Saharan Africa (38.6). Poor transparency on access to resources and lack 
of information on revenue transparency for the majority of countries are the drivers of low scores in 
the region, despite the good governance efforts of some countries, including EITI implementation.  
The MENA region has no countries at the top of the ranking and comes second-to-last on the regional 
average (40.9). By and large, MENA countries perform badly in terms of information on access to 
resources, with no country scoring more than 50 in this section of the Revenue Watch Index, which is 
striking given the fact that the region holds more than half of the world’s reserves for hydrocarbons. 
Countries in this region also perform poorly on access to information on generation of revenue, 
despite generating one third of the world’s oil production.
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 Iraq has a strong performance on revenue 
transparency, doing very well on the Special Resource Fund in particular, a legacy of the Development 
Fund for Iraq created by UN Resolution 1483 in 2003. Algeria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are in the low-
est tiers across all the different categories of revenue transparency. 
As for the Asia-Pacific region (average score of 50.1), all its countries except Timor-Leste hover in the 
Partial Revenue Transparency area of the table, despite the fact that EITI implementation is almost 
absent from the region. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia are the top performers of the 
Central Asia/Russia region (which has an average score of 63) and are included in the Comprehen-
sive Revenue Transparency category. In part, this is explained by state agencies providing periodical 
reports, but also because of adoption of EITI in Kazakhstan. Turkmenistan performs poorly across all 
categories of revenue transparency. 
All Latin American countries have average scores above 50 on the Revenue Watch Index (average 
score of 72.6), and the region dominates the highest tier of revenue transparency, although it could 
improve on EITI participation.
39
 Bolivia, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela appear at the bottom 
of the scores for this region, with Venezuela performing badly on transparency of information for 
access to resources and the special resource fund.
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Finally, OECD countries come on top of regional averages (82.9). Norway is at or near the top of all 
categories of the index, which shows why it is frequently used as an example of good practice.  
For the United States the research considers only the federal management of the Gulf of Mexico.  
Although the nation scores high on transparency of access to resources, it performs around average 
on transparency of generation of revenue and is not implementing EITI. Meanwhile, Chile represents 
the highest scoring for mining countries in terms of revenue transparency.
. 
 Conclusions and  
Recommendations
The Revenue Watch Index shows that the majority of countries examined by this report provide  
limited public information on their natural resource sector. This lack of transparency undermines 
the ability of citizens to hold their governments to account for their performance in managing  
public resources. 
Governments manage sub-surface resources as agents of their citizens. In every resource-rich 
country, governments exert indirect guidance through regulation or direct control of exploration and 
extraction of mineral resources through state-owned companies. They need to publish full accounts 
of what their countries produce, the terms and conditions of concessions, and the payments they 
receive in order to give citizens the opportunity to evaluate their performance. 
This index provides a comprehensive picture of the areas in which governmental efforts to increase 
transparency—including public access to major investment agreements and comprehensive  
disclosure in the payments governments receive from the oil, gas and mining sectors—are needed. 
Some states have made significant advances in the quest to improve access to information, but we 
find substantial room for improvement. Despite a formal commitment by many governments to 
disclose payments and revenue from oil, gas and mining activities, essential public information 
remains incomplete. 
The results from this index suggest that the justification for secrecy of resource data based on 
security or contractual confidentiality is largely unfounded. The report provides abundant evidence 
that many countries readily disclose information on topics that other governments still try to keep 
confidential without discernible adverse consequences. 
Transparency alone is insufficient to counter the potential negative effects of extractive industries. 
However, the increased availability of credible and verifiable information has been demonstrated to 
improve the quality of resource management.
policy recommendations
To governments:
1.  contract transparency needs to improve substantially in all resource-rich countries. contracts, 
details about investment agreements and the fiscal regime in the extractive sector should be 
open to public scrutiny. The index shows that licensing and contracting of access to resources is 
the area where disclosure of information is most limited. Only a few countries reviewed publish 
their contracts, making monitoring of revenue performance and compliance difficult. In many 
countries, contracts are not even shared with non-resource ministries. Publication of the fiscal 
terms of exploration and production should be mandatory, ideally by law. Publication of con-
tracts, leases or licensing terms should be incorporated in EITI transparency templates. 
2.  countries that are important international financial hubs for extractive companies should take 
the lead in promoting transparency in the sector. The United States is the largest economy in 
the world, one of the main consumers of natural resources as well as a host country for many 
7Results by Region
In every resource- 
rich country, govern-
ments exert indirect 
guidance through 
regulation or direct 
control of explora-
tion and extraction 
of mineral resources 
through state-owned 
companies.
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of the most important petroleum and mining companies in the world. The U.S. government has 
recently demonstrated leadership in promoting transparency and good governance by approv-
ing financial reform legislation that includes requirements for resource companies to disclose 
detailed financial information on oil, gas and mining projects.
41
 Other industrialized nations that 
are major players in oil, gas and mining markets should adopt similar disclosure requirements. 
3.  all resource-rich countries should implement eiTi. The index shows that weak transparency 
performance is not limited to countries of a certain income level or region. EITI offers a simple 
mechanism for countries across the globe to ensure the systematic disclosure and dissemination 
of information on payments and revenue from the resource sector. EITI offers concrete method-
ologies and experiences for sharing information and findings with civil society organizations, 
protocols that are designed to build trust among very diverse stakeholders. Developed countries 
such as Norway are implementing this initiative. Implementation of EITI should also be adopted 
by resource-rich countries from the MENA region as well as countries like Australia, Canada, the 
United Kingdom and the United States.
  
4.  resource ministries should meet the same standard of reporting and data provision as other 
public institutions controlling important public resources, notably the central banks and finance 
ministries. The index shows that in the same country, the latter perform significantly better than 
the resource institutions. This is no accident. After multiple international sovereign debt and 
banking crises, governments have recognized a shared interest in ensuring greater transparency 
in the financial sectors. Through a cooperative international process, central banks and finance 
ministries have developed models for regular publication of standardized and comparable data. 
No such protocol for reporting of vital data in a standardized format exists among agencies 
charged with minerals management even though their potential impact on government finances 
is arguably as great. The IMF’s Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency could be a starting point 
for governments of the major resource-producing countries to develop and agree a common data 
standard for resource-ministries and agencies.  
5.  Governments should make periodic, comprehensive and timely reporting a mandatory require-
ment for their state-owned companies. SOCs are present in almost all the countries in this index 
and account for nearly 80 percent of the world’s hydrocarbon reserves. These companies should 
disclose all information on their operations and finances to their ultimate stakeholders, their 
citizens. Among the countries in the survey, only 14 have an SOC that publishes full reports on 
its operations, including a balance sheet and a profit and loss statement. This information is 
necessary for accountability, efficiency and to ensure that SOCs fulfill their mandate rather than 
become vehicles of private interest. 
6.  countries with natural resource funds should develop measurable benchmarks to monitor trans-
parency and accountability of these accounts. NRFs are common among countries in this index, 
with 20 out of 41 using this instrument to manage revenue from oil, gas and mining activities. 
However, transparency in NRFs remains uneven, and citizens often lack information on the rules 
governing the fund as well as timely, periodical and audited information about the funds’ assets 
and expenditures. Many countries with NRFs adhere to the Santiago Principles for Sovereign 
Wealth Funds, but transparency requirements should be strengthened and institutionalized.  
7.  Governments should make information about resource revenue transfers available to all their 
citizens. sub-national governments should be held to the same disclosure standards as national 
governments. Sub-national transfers are arrangements that allow a proportion of revenues gener-
ated by oil and mining to be returned to producing regions or local governments. The absence of 
public information on transfers can increase the risk of mismanagement of revenues both at the 
national level, from rent-seeking interests and individuals targeting centralized budgets, and at 
the local level, where sub-national governments could take advantage of the lack of transparency. 
8.  parliaments in resource-rich countries need to make better use of their oversight powers to 
provide more effective checks on executive powers. Parliamentary oversight shows mixed 
results, with only four countries in the survey having parliaments approve contracts and 16 
countries having parliamentary committees scrutinize resource-related revenue. RWI has been 
piloting projects with that goal in Tanzania, Uganda and Ghana.
To international organizations:
1.  The international accounting standards Board (iasB) should approve reforms requiring com-
panies to report key information about oil and mining activities on a country-by-country basis. 
Disclosure should include details on reserves, volume, sales and costs of production, as well as 
benefit streams to governments. This information is valuable for investors as well as for the gov-
ernments and citizens of resource-producing countries. An international accounting standard for 
extractive companies is all the more essential since U.S.’ passage of the 2010 Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act. This reform would also help standardize reporting by state compa-
nies. Half the countries included in this survey have state-owned companies that have adopted 
internationally recognized accounting standards. Revised rules from the IASB would have an 
immediate impact on resource-rich countries’ transparency and accountability.
2.  policy makers in G20 countries should agree on a set of transparency standards for resource 
management and commit to follow good practices at home. Revenue transparency should 
receive significant consideration within the framework of the financial reform discussions con-
ducted at the G20 meetings. The eight countries in the Revenue Watch Index that are members of 
the G20 show a wide range of revenue transparency, with a maximum average score of 97 and a 
minimum of 32. G20 countries should disclose detailed information on their own extractive sec-
tors and support transparency requirements in international financial reforms.  
3.  international financial institutions and donors should support countries implementing eiTi and 
promote contract transparency in the extractive sector. The Revenue Watch Index should be 
used to assess progress of countries receiving support for improving natural resource man-
agement and implementing EITI. The World Bank Group should continue to promote greater 
disclosure of information—particularly investment agreements—from governments receiving 
financial support and also from private resource companies through the activities of the Interna-
tional Financial Corporation (IFC). The IFC should immediately require that projects in which it 
invests publish contracts or licenses.  
To the eiTi international board and eiTi members:
1.  eiTi requirements need to be strengthened. EITI is the global minimum standard for extractive 
payment and revenue transparency, but a significant number of EITI countries still provide only 
partial or scant revenue information. The index results show that EITI guidelines are so general 
as to allow a very low level of transparency. New guidelines should be adopted to require a higher 
and more uniform transparency performance for countries to qualify for EITI validation. Disag-
gregation of company payments and type of payments should be standard. This will already be 
required of much of the extractive industry under the 2010 Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act. Publication of contracts should be added to the EITI module. 
Conclusions and  
Recommendations
EITI offers a simple 
mechanism for  
countries across the 
globe to ensure the 
systematic disclosure 
and dissemination  
of information on 
payments and  
revenue from the  
resource sector. 
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2.  disclosure of information should be verifiable, regular, comprehensive and timely. A signifi-
cant number of EITI countries still provide only partial or scant revenue transparency, which is  
EITI’s core purpose. The board should convene a panel of experts to refine the reporting tem-
plates. Disclosure of information should include credible, regular, comprehensive and timely 
reporting from all the agencies involved in overseeing or regulating exploration and production 
of natural resources.
To civil society organizations:
1.  civil society organizations working on extractive sector issues should use this index as a tool to 
assess progress and weaknesses in resource revenue transparency. This assessment, and inter-
national comparisons based on it, could be the basis of an objective dialogue with governments, 
media and oversight bodies to promote specific reforms aimed at strengthening transparency 
and accountability. In countries implementing EITI, civil society organizations can contribute to 
the success of this initiative by using the information provided by this index to expand work on 
accountability beyond the disclosure of revenues.
2.  The index can serve as a road map for action by civil society organizations, allowing them to fo-
cus their efforts on increasing transparency in major areas of weakness in countries where they 
operate. For instance, they can use the index results to urge governments to disclose information 
on financial payments or use the scores to provide advice to advocacy campaigns. The results of 
the index can also empower citizens, since it provides information to launch an informed debate 
about the management of natural resources and good practices for revenue transparency in their 
respective countries. The index is a tool that citizens can use to require greater accountability 
from governments and companies involved in the extractive sector.
Conclusions and  
Recommendations
Appendix 1: 
revenue Watch index Questions
    Type of 
 Question  question
 a. access To resources 
1.   Has this country adopted a rule or legislation that provides for disclosure of information TR* 
in the oil, gas and mineral sectors?
2.   Are contracts, agreements or negotiated terms for exploration and  TR 
production, regardless of the way they are granted, disclosed to the public? 
3.   Does the government publish information on the licensing process during or after negotiations? TR
4.  Are reports with assessments of the expected environmental and/or social impact of oil,  TR 
gas and mining projects published?
5.  Is the authority in charge of awarding licenses or contracts for mineral or hydrocarbon production LRF** 
independent of the state-owned company (SOC) or other operating companies?  
6.   Is the licensing process intended to be open and competitive to all interested companies? LRF
7.   Does the licensing process or legislation impose limits to discretionary  LRF 
powers of the authority in charge of awarding licenses or contracts? 
8.  Does the legislative branch have the authority to ratify oil and mining contracts? LRF
9.  Is there a process to appeal licensing decisions? LRF
 B. GeneraTion oF revenue 
10.  Does the ministry of finance publish some or all of the information on revenue  TR 
generation presented in the table below (in reports or statistical databases)?  
 a. Reserves f. Production costs j1.  Production streams value  j6. Bonuses 
 b. Production volumes g.  Names of companies j2. Government’s share j7. License fees 
operating in country       in PSC 
 c. Information on prices h.  Production data by  j3. Royalties j8. Acreage fees 
company and/or block 
 d. Value of resource exports i. Quasi-fiscal activities j4. Special taxes j9. Other 
 e.  Estimates of investment in  j. Disaggregated revenue  j5. Dividends 
exploration and development    streams
11.  Are the reports or statistical databases published by the ministry of finance comprehensive and understandable? TR
12.  How often are the reports or statistical databases containing information on revenue generation published TR  
by the ministry of finance?   
13.  Does the ministry of the extractive sector publish some or all of the information on revenue generation presented  TR 
in the table below (in reports or statistical databases)?  (Response items are the same as in question 10) 
14.  Are the reports or statistical databases published by the ministry of the  TR 
extractive sector comprehensive and understandable? 
15.  How often are the reports or statistical databases containing information on revenue generation published  TR 
by the ministry of the extractive sector? 
16.  Does the regulatory agency publish some or all of the information on revenue generation presented in TR 
the table below (in reports or statistical databases)? (Response items are the same as in question 10) 
All data from the report and appendices, including the full questionnaire, is available online at www.revenuewatch.org/rwindex.
*TR: Transparency **LRF: Legal and Regulatory Framework36 37
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    Type of 
 Question  Question
17.  Are the reports or statistical databases published by the regulatory agency comprehensive and understandable? TR
18.  How often are the reports or statistical databases containing information on revenue generation published  TR 
by the regulatory agency? 
19.  Does the central bank publish some or all of the information on revenue  TR 
generation presented in the table below (in reports or statistical databases)? 
20.  Are the reports or statistical databases published by the central bank comprehensive and understandable?  TR
21.  How often are the reports or statistical databases containing information on revenue generation  TR 
published by the central bank? 
22.  Does the state-owned company publish some or all of the information on revenue generation presented in the table TR 
below (in reports or statistical databases)? (Response items are the same as in question 10) 
23.  Are the reports or statistical databases published by the state-owned company comprehensive and understandable? TR
24.  How often are the reports or statistical databases containing information on revenue generation published  TR
by the state-owned company? 
 c. insTiTuTional seTTinG 
25.  Are policy, regulatory and commercial roles in the extractive sector divided across separate institutions? LRF
26. Has the government published detailed resource legislation? TR
27.  Does the agency (or agencies) in charge of receiving payments from resource  LRF 
companies have internal controls in place to monitor assets and prevent fraud? 
28.  Is there independent external validation of internal controls of agencies  LRF 
in charge of receiving payments from resource companies? 
29.  Are payments by resource companies to the government (either to the ministry  LRF 
of the resource sector or other authorized agency) subject to an independent audit? 
30.  Does a parliamentary committee scrutinize audit reports on resource-related revenues? LRF 
31.  Can civil society participate in oversight of revenue generation, through EITI committees, board meetings LRF 
of the resource regulatory authority, or other mechanisms? 
 d. sTaTe-oWned oil, Gas and mininG companies 
32. If an SOC exists, does the SOC publish information about its operations? TR
33. Does the SOC follow internationally recognized accounting standards? LRF
34. Are SOC reports audited, and are the audited reports published? TR
35. Do SOC audits include consolidated accounts that cover all of the SOC subsidiaries? LRF
36. Does the SOC publish information about quasi-fiscal activities? TR
37.  Does the ministry of finance publish the overall public sector balance including the SOC financial balance? TR
38.  If there are joint ventures, does the government (ministry of the sector or SOC)  TR 
publish information on the SOC equity participation in joint ventures? 
39.  Are government officials required to disclose information about their financial  TR 
interest in any extractive activity or joint venture?  
    Type of 
 Question  Question
40. Does the SOC publish information on the composition of its board of directors? TR 
 e. naTural resource Fund 
41.  If a resource fund exists, are the rules governing the fund publicly available? (This in- TR  
cludes information on how the instrument is funded, as well as rules for disbursement.) 
42.  If a resource fund exists, does the fund management or authority in charge of the  TR 
fund publish information on its assets and transactions? 
43.  How often does the fund management or authority in charge of the fund publish these reports? TR
44. Are the fund financial reports audited, and are audited reports published? TR
 F. suB-naTional TransFers 
45.  Are arrangements for resource revenue sharing between central and sub-national governments set in legislation?  LRF
46.  Are the rules for revenue transfers from central to sub-national governments  TR 
published, including the formula(s) for revenue sharing? 
47.  Does the central government publish information on transfers of  TR 
resource-related revenues to sub-national governments? 
48.  How often does the central government publish information on transfers  TR 
of resource related revenues to sub-national governments? 
49. Is the information on transfers of resource-related revenues comprehensive? TR
50.  Do sub-national governments publish information on transfers received from central governments? TR
 G. eiTi 
51. Is this country an EITI candidate or compliant country? TR
52. If this country has adopted EITI, has this country published an EITI report? TR
53.  In the EITI report, have all the payments and revenue been audited by an independent auditor? TR
54.  In the EITI report, have all payments and revenue been reconciled by an independent administrator? TR
55.  In the EITI report, is information about payments and revenue from state-owned companies included? TR
Appendix 1
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I 1
Has this country adopted a rule or legislation that  
provides for disclosure of information in the oil, gas  
and mineral sectors?
TR* 1 0 0 100 67 0 100 0 100 33 100 0 100 0 0 67 100 0 0 N/A 0 100 0 100 33 0 100 0 100 N/A 0 33 100 0 0 33 100 0 100 0 0 33
I 2
Are contracts, agreements or negotiated terms for 
exploration and production, regardless of the way they 
are granted, disclosed to the public?
TR 1 0 67 0 33 0 67 33 0 0 100 33 33 67 0 33 33 33 67 33 0 100 33 33 67 0 67 67 100 67 0 33 N/A 0 0 100 33 0 100 33 33 0
I 3 Does the government publish information on the  licensing process during or after negotiations? TR 1 100 100 N/A 0 0 100 100 N/A 100 100 N/A 100 100 100 0 100 N/A 100 100 0 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 N/A 0 0 0 0 100 100 0 100 N/A 100 0
I 4
Are reports with assessments of the expected  
environmental and/or social impact of oil, gas and  
mining projects published?
TR 1 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 N/A 100 0 0 100 100 100 100 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 100
I 5
Is the authority in charge of awarding licenses or  
contracts for mineral or hydrocarbon production  
independent of the state-owned company (SOC) or 
other operating companies? 
LRF** 0 0 0 100 0 100 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 0 100 0 0 100 0 100 100 N/A 100 0 100 100 0 100 100 100 0 100 0 100 100
I 6 Is the licensing process intended to be open and  competitive to all interested companies? LRF 0 33 100 100 0 67 100 0 67 33 100 33 0 0 0 100 67 0 100 67 0 100 33 100 67 33 100 100 100 0 0 100 67 0 67 100 100 0 100 0 100 100
I 7
Does the licensing process or legislation impose limits 
to discretionary powers of the authority in charge of 
awarding licenses or contracts?
LRF 0 0 100 100 0 0 100 0 100 0 100 100 0 0 0 0 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 100 100 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 100 N/A 0 100 100 0 100 0 100 0
I 8 Does the legislative branch have the authority to ratify oil and mining contracts? LRF 0 0 0 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 67 0 0 67 0 0 0 67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 67 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 67 0
I 9 Is there a process to appeal licensing decisions? LRF 0 0 33 0 0 0 33 0 67 N/A 33 0 0 0 0 33 0 N/A 33 33 0 100 0 0 67 33 33 0 100 33 33 33 100 N/A 0 33 0 0 0 0 0 100
II 10
Does the Ministry of Finance publish some or all of  
the information on revenue generation presented in  
the table below (in reports or statistical databases)? 
TR
II 10 a Reserves TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 67 0 N/A 0 0 0
II 10 b Production volumes TR 0 N/A 33 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100 0 N/A N/A 0 0 100 100 0 100 100 0 100 N/A 0 0 100 100 100 0 67 0 N/A 0 0 100
II 10 c Information on prices TR 0 N/A 100 0 100 0 100 0 0 0 67 0 0 0 100 67 100 0 N/A N/A 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 N/A 0 0 100 100 0 0 67 0 N/A 0 100 0
II 10 d Value of resource exports TR 0 33 100 0 100 100 100 0 0 0 67 0 100 0 100 33 100 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A 100 100 67 100 100 0 0 N/A 100 0 100 100 100 0 0 0 N/A 0 100 100
II 10 e Estimates of investment in exploration and development TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 67 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 N/A N/A 100 100 100 100 0 0 100 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 100 0
II 10 f Production costs TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 N/A N/A 100 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0
II 10 g Names of companies operating in country TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0 100 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 100
II 10 h Production data by company and/or block TR 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 100
II 10 i Quasi-fiscal activities TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 67 0 0 0 0 N/A 100 0 0 N/A 0 0 0
II 10 j Disaggregated revenue streams: TR 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
II 10 j1 Production streams value TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 100 100 0 0 100 0 67 N/A 0 0 67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0
II 10 j2 Government’s share in PSC TR 0 0 33 100 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 100 0 N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 100 N/A N/A 67 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 100 0 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A
II 10 j3 Royalties TR 0 0 33 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 100 67 100 0 N/A 100 0 0 100 100 100 67 N/A 0 100 67 0 67 N/A 0 0 0 100 0 0 100 100 0
II 10 j4 Special taxes TR 0 0 100 100 100 100 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 N/A 100 0 0 100 100 100 67 N/A 0 100 67 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 N/A 100 100 0
II 10 j5 Dividends TR 0 0 0 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 67 0 0 0 67 0 0 N/A 100 0 N/A 100 N/A 0 0 100 100 0 67 0 0 100 0 0 0 67 0 N/A 100 0 0
II 10 j6 Bonuses TR 0 0 33 100 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 100 0 100 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 67 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0
II 10 j7 License fees TR 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 100 0 N/A 0 N/A 100 0 N/A 0 0 67 0 67 100 0 0 0 67 0 N/A 0 100 0
II 10 j8 Acreage fees TR 0 0 0 100 100 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 100 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 67 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 100 0
II 10 j9 Other TR 0 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A 100 N/A 0 N/A 100 100 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 100 0 0 N/A N/A 0 0
II 11 Are the reports or statistical databases published by the Ministry of Finance comprehensive and understandable? TR 1 33 100 N/A 100 67 100 0 0 67 33 0 100 0 67 33 67 0 N/A 100 33 67 100 100 33 33 100 100 33 100 33 67 100 67 N/A 100 100 0 0 67 67 67
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II 12
How often are the reports or statistical databases  
containing information on revenue generation  
published by the ministry of finance?
TR 1 0 100 N/A 33 100 100 0 100 100 67 0 100 0 33 67 67 0 N/A 100 33 33 33 100 100 N/A 100 100 100 100 33 33 100 67 N/A 33 33 0 0 33 100 100
II 13
Does the Ministry of the extractive sector publish 
some or all of the information on revenue generation 
presented in the table below (in reports or statistical 
databases)? 
TR
II 13 a Reserves TR 0 33 33 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 33 N/A 0 0 0 100 0 100 100 0 0 N/A 100 0 0 67 33 100 33 0 0 33 N/A 100 N/A 100 0 33 100 0 0
II 13 b Production volumes TR 0 33 67 0 0 100 100 0 33 0 100 33 N/A 0 100 33 100 0 100 100 0 0 N/A 100 67 0 33 33 100 67 100 0 100 N/A 67 N/A 100 67 100 100 100 0
II 13 c Information on prices TR 0 0 67 0 100 0 100 0 33 0 100 0 N/A 0 33 0 100 0 100 N/A 0 100 N/A 100 100 0 100 67 100 N/A 0 0 100 N/A 0 N/A 100 67 0 100 100 0
II 13 d Value of resource exports TR 0 33 67 0 0 0 0 0 33 0 100 0 N/A 0 33 0 0 0 100 100 0 100 N/A 100 67 0 33 0 100 67 0 33 100 N/A 67 N/A 100 67 0 33 100 0
II 13 e Estimates of investment in exploration and  development TR 0 33 67 0 100 0 100 0 0 0 100 33 N/A 0 0 0 100 0 0 33 0 67 N/A 0 N/A 0 33 67 100 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 67 N/A 0 0 0 33 100 0
II 13 f Production costs TR 0 0 67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 0 33 0 0
II 13 g Names of companies operating in country TR 0 100 67 0 67 100 0 0 0 0 67 33 N/A 100 0 0 67 0 100 0 0 100 N/A 0 N/A 0 N/A 33 100 67 0 0 33 N/A 0 N/A 100 100 100 33 100 0
II 13 h Production data by company and/or block TR 0 33 67 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 67 33 N/A 67 0 0 0 0 100 100 0 0 N/A 100 N/A 0 N/A 67 100 100 0 0 33 N/A 0 N/A 100 67 100 100 100 0
II 13 i Quasi-fiscal activities TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 N/A 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 100 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 0 100 33 0 N/A
II 13 j Disaggregated revenue streams: TR 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
II 13 j1 Production streams value TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 0 0 N/A 100 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 100 0 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 0 33 100 0
II 13 j2 Government’s share in PSC TR 0 33 67 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 100 N/A
II 13 j3 Royalties TR 0 33 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 N/A 0 0 0 67 0 100 N/A 0 100 N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A 67 100 N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A 67 0 100 100 100 33
II 13 j4 Special taxes TR 0 33 67 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 100 N/A 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A 0 100 N/A 0 33 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 0 100 0 33
II 13 j5 Dividends TR 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 0 100 0 33
II 13 j6 Bonuses TR 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 0 67 0 100 N/A 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A 0 0 100 100 0 0
II 13 j7 License fees TR 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 100 N/A 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A 0 0 100 0 33 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0
II 13 j8 Acreage fees TR 0 N/A 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 33 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0
II 13 j9 Other TR 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 67 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A 0 0 100 N/A
II 14
Are the reports or statistical databases published by  
the Ministry of the extractive sector comprehensive  
and understandable?
TR 1 33 67 N/A 67 33 100 0 67 33 67 0 N/A 0 33 0 67 0 67 67 0 67 N/A 100 67 0 N/A 100 100 67 0 0 100 N/A 0 N/A 33 33 100 67 67 0
II 15
How often are the reports or statistical databases  
containing information on revenue generation  
published by the ministry of the extractive sector?
TR 1 33 33 N/A 33 33 100 0 33 N/A 67 0 N/A 0 33 0 33 0 100 100 0 33 N/A 100 33 0 N/A 0 100 N/A 0 0 67 N/A 0 N/A 100 N/A 33 33 33 33
II 16
Does the regulatory agency publish some or all of  
the information on revenue generation presented in  
the table below (in reports or statistical databases)?
TR
II 16 a Reserves TR 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 N/A 0 N/A 67 0 0 0 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 100 N/A N/A N/A
II 16 b Production volumes TR 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 100 100 100 0 100 0 100 0 0 33 0 0 100 N/A 0 N/A 67 33 67 0 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 100 0 0 100 N/A N/A N/A
II 16 c Information on prices TR 0 N/A 0 0 33 N/A 100 100 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 N/A 0 N/A 100 100 67 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 100 N/A N/A N/A
II 16 d Value of resource exports TR 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 100 100 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 67 0 N/A 0 0 67 0 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 100 0 0 100 N/A N/A N/A
II 16 e Estimates of investment in exploration and  development TR 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 100 100 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
II 16 f Production costs TR 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 0 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 100 N/A N/A N/A
II 16 g Names of companies operating in country TR 0 N/A 100 0 0 N/A 100 100 100 0 100 0 100 100 0 0 0 0 100 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 67 0 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 100 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
II 16 h Production data by company and/or block TR 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 100 100 100 0 0 0 100 67 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 67 0 0 67 N/A N/A N/A
II 16 i Quasi-fiscal activities TR 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
II 16 j Disaggregated revenue streams: TR 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
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II 16 j1 Production streams value TR 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 100 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
II 16 j2 Government’s share in PSC TR 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 100 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
II 16 j3 Royalties TR 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
II 16 j4 Special taxes TR 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
II 16 j5 Dividends TR 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
II 16 j6 Bonuses TR 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 100 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
II 16 j7 License fees TR 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 67 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
II 16 j8 Acreage fees TR 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A
II 16 j9 Other TR 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 0 0 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A
II 17 Are the reports or statistical databases published by the regulatory agency comprehensive and understandable? TR 1 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 100 33 100 0 100 0 100 0 N/A 0 0 0 67 100 0 N/A 0 67 33 0 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 67 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0
II 18
How often are the reports or statistical databases  
containing information on revenue generation  
published by the regulatory agency?
TR 1 N/A 0 N/A 0 N/A 100 33 100 0 100 0 100 0 N/A 0 0 0 100 33 0 N/A 0 100 0 0 33 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 100 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0
II 19
Does the central bank publish some or all of the  
information on revenue generation presented in the 
table below (in reports or statistical databases)?
TR
II 19 a Reserves TR 0 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 N/A 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100 0 0 0
II 19 b Production volumes TR 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100 100 0 0 100 100 33 100 0 0 100 100 N/A 33 100 100 33 0 100 0 0 100 N/A 100 100 100 33 100 0 100 0 100 0 0 100
II 19 c Information on prices TR 0 0 33 0 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 100 33 100 100 0 100 100 100 33 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 33 100 0 67 0 N/A 0 0 100
II 19 d Value of resource exports TR 0 0 33 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 0 100 33 100 100 100 100 100 N/A 33 100 100 0 67 100 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 33 100 0 67 0 N/A 100 100 100
II 19 e Estimates of investment in exploration and  development TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 67 33 N/A 0 100 0
II 19 f Production costs TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 N/A 0 0 0
II 19 g Names of companies operating in country TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0 100 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 0 100 N/A 100 67 0 0 0 0 67 33 N/A 0 0 0
II 19 h Production data by company and/or block TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 100 N/A 0 0 0 33 0 0 67 33 N/A 0 0 0
II 19 i Quasi-fiscal activities TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 100 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 N/A 100 0 N/A N/A 0 0 0
II 19 j Disaggregated revenue streams: TR 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
II 19 j1 Production streams value TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 100 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0
II 19 j2 Government’s share in PSC TR 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 100 0 0 N/A 0 100 N/A
II 19 j3 Royalties TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 100 N/A N/A 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 100 N/A 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 100
II 19 j4 Special taxes TR 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 100 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 100 0 0 0 0 100 0 N/A 0 0 67
II 19 j5 Dividends TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 100 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 100 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0
II 19 j6 Bonuses TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0
II 19 j7 License fees TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0
II 19 j8 Acreage fees TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0
II 19 j9 Other TR 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 0 100 0 0 N/A 0 100 0 N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 67
II 20 Are the reports or statistical databases published by  the central bank comprehensive and understandable? TR 1 0 33 N/A 67 100 100 100 67 0 100 33 100 33 100 33 100 67 67 100 33 67 100 67 33 67 N/A 100 100 67 100 67 100 67 33 100 100 0 N/A 67 67 67
II 21
How often are the reports or statistical databases  
containing information on revenue generation  
published by the central bank?
TR 1 0 0 33 33 100 100 N/A 100 0 67 67 100 33 33 100 33 100 100 100 33 33 100 100 0 100 N/A 100 100 100 33 33 100 67 100 100 100 0 N/A 100 100 100
II 22
Does the state-owned company publish some or all  
of the information on revenue generation presented in 
the table below (in reports or statistical databases)?
TR
II 22 a Reserves TR 0 33 0 N/A 33 0 100 0 100 100 100 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 33 100 0 100 0 N/A 100 100 0 100 100 0 N/A 100 100 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 100 0 N/A 100 0 0
II 22 b Production volumes TR 0 33 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 N/A 100 0 0 N/A 33 100 0 100 55 N/A 100 100 0 100 100 0 N/A 100 100 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 100 33 N/A 100 100 0
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II 22 c Information on prices TR 0 0 0 100 100 0 100 100 100 0 100 N/A 100 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 100 11 N/A 100 100 0 100 100 0 N/A 0 0 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 67 0 N/A 100 100 0
II 22 d Value of resource exports TR 0 33 0 100 67 0 100 100 100 0 100 N/A 100 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 100 44 N/A 100 100 0 100 N/A 0 N/A 100 0 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 67 0 N/A 100 100 0
II 22 e Estimates of investment in exploration and  development TR 0 33 0 67 67 0 100 100 100 100 100 N/A 100 0 0 N/A 33 0 0 100 55 N/A 100 100 0 0 100 0 N/A 100 0 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 0 33 N/A 100 100 0
II 22 f Production costs TR 0 33 0 67 N/A 0 100 100 100 100 100 N/A 100 0 0 N/A 33 0 0 100 55 N/A 100 100 0 0 100 100 N/A 100 0 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 67 0 N/A 67 0 0
II 22 g Names of companies operating in country TR 0 33 100 67 100 N/A 100 100 N/A 0 67 N/A 100 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 22 N/A 67 100 0 100 N/A 0 N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 33 67 N/A 67 0 N/A 33 100 0
II 22 h Production data by company and/or block TR 0 33 0 67 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 N/A 100 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 100 33 N/A 0 100 0 100 100 0 N/A 100 100 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A 33 100 0
II 22 i Quasi-fiscal activities TR 0 0 0 67 0 100 100 0 100 100 100 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 100 11 N/A 0 100 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 100 0 0
II 22 j Disaggregated revenue streams: TR 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
II 22 j1 Production streams value TR 0 33 0 67 0 0 100 0 100 100 0 N/A 100 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 100 44 N/A 0 100 0 0 100 0 N/A 100 0 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 100 100 0
II 22 j2 Government’s share in PSC TR 0 33 0 0 67 N/A 100 0 100 100 67 N/A 100 0 0 N/A 0 N/A N/A 100 33 N/A 100 N/A N/A 0 100 N/A N/A 100 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A N/A 100 N/A
II 22 j3 Royalties TR 0 33 0 0 0 N/A 100 0 100 0 33 N/A 100 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 100 0 N/A 0 100 0 0 N/A 100 N/A 100 0 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 100 100 0
II 22 j4 Special taxes TR 0 33 0 0 0 0 100 0 100 0 0 N/A 100 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 100 0 N/A 0 100 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 100 0 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 100 0 0
II 22 j5 Dividends TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100 100 100 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 100 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 100 100 N/A 100 0 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 100 0 0
II 22 j6 Bonuses TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100 0 N/A N/A 0 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 100 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 100 0 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 100 0 0
II 22 j7 License fees TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 100 17 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0
II 22 j8 Acreage fees TR 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 N/A 0 N/A N/A 100 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 N/A 0 0 0
II 22 j9 Other TR 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 N/A N/A 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 17 N/A 100 N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 100 N/A
II 23
Are the reports or statistical databases published  
by the state-owned company comprehensive and 
understandable?
TR 1 33 0 67 67 33 100 33 100 67 100 N/A 100 0 0 N/A 100 0 0 100 100 N/A 100 100 0 100 100 67 N/A 100 67 N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A 33 0 N/A 67 67 0
II 24
How often are the reports or statistical databases  
containing information on revenue generation  
published by the state-owned company?
TR 1 33 0 100 33 33 100 33 100 33 100 N/A 100 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 33 50 N/A 67 100 0 33 100 33 N/A 100 33 N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A 33 0 N/A 33 33 0
II GOV a
Consolidated Government Scores from Questions 10, 
13, 16, 19 & 22
TR 1 33 33 0 33 0 100 0 100 100 100 33 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 0 100 100 33 100 100 100 0 33 0 100 0 100 0 100 100 0 0
II GOV b TR 1 33 67 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 33 100 33 100 100 100 100 55 100 100 100 67 100 100 33 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 67 100 100 100 100
II GOV c TR 1 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 0 100 33 100 100 100 100 100 100 33 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 67 100 100 100 100
II GOV d TR 1 33 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 0 100 33 100 100 100 100 100 100 44 100 100 100 67 100 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 67 100 100 100 100
II GOV e TR 1 33 67 67 100 0 100 100 100 0 100 33 100 0 0 0 100 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 0 0 100 67 100 100 0 0 0 0 67 0 67 33 0 100 100 0
II GOV f TR 1 33 67 67 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 100 100 100 0 100 100 0 0 100 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100 67 0 0
II GOV g TR 1 100 100 67 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 33 100 100 100 33 67 0 100 100 22 100 67 100 67 100 100 33 100 67 100 67 33 100 67 100 100 100 100 33 100 100
II GOV h TR 1 33 100 67 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 33 100 67 100 0 0 0 100 100 33 100 0 100 0 100 100 67 100 100 100 0 33 100 0 67 100 67 100 100 100 100
II GOV i TR 1 0 0 67 0 100 100 0 100 100 100 0 0 0 100 N/A 100 100 0 100 11 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 100 67 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 100 100 0 0
II GOV j TR 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
II GOV j1 TR 1 33 0 67 0 0 100 33 100 100 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 0 0 100 0 67 100 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 100 0
II GOV j2 TR 1 33 67 100 67 0 100 33 100 100 67 N/A 100 0 33 N/A 0 0 0 100 33 N/A 100 0 N/A 0 100 0 N/A 100 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 100 0 0 N/A 0 100 N/A
II GOV j3 TR 1 33 33 100 100 100 100 33 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 67 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 100 67 100 100 100 100 0 100 0 0 0 100 100 0 100 100 100 100
II GOV j4 TR 1 33 100 100 100 100 100 33 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 33 0 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 100 67 100 0 100 100 0 100 100 0 0 100 100 0 N/A 100 100 67
II GOV j5 TR 1 0 0 100 0 100 100 33 100 100 100 0 0 0 33 67 0 100 0 100 0 67 100 0 33 0 100 100 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 0 67 0 N/A 100 0 33
II GOV j6 TR 1 0 33 100 0 0 100 33 100 0 0 0 0 0 33 N/A 67 0 100 100 0 67 0 0 33 33 N/A 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100 100 0 0
II GOV j7 TR 1 0 0 100 0 0 100 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 33 0 0 100 100 17 67 0 0 100 33 N/A 0 33 100 0 100 100 0 0 100 67 0 67 0 100 0
II GOV j8 TR 1 0 0 100 100 0 100 33 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 100 0 67 0 0 33 33 100 0 0 67 0 33 100 0 0 100 0 0 67 0 100 0
II GOV j9 TR 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 67 N/A N/A N/A 17 100 100 N/A N/A N/A 100 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 67
III 25 Are policy, regulatory, and commercial roles in the extractive sector divided across separate institutions? LRF 0 N/A 0 67 67 67 100 0 100 N/A 100 100 67 100 N/A 100 67 67 100 100 33 100 0 67 100 33 100 100 100 67 33 100 100 33 N/A 100 67 N/A 100 33 100 100
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III 26 Has the government published detailed resource legislation? TR 1 33 67 33 100 100 100 67 100 67 100 100 100 67 67 67 67 33 67 67 33 67 33 100 67 67 100 100 100 67 33 100 100 0 100 100 100 33 100 100 67 67
III 27
Does the agency (or agencies) in charge of receiving 
payments from resource companies have internal  
controls in place to monitor assets and prevent fraud?
LRF 0 0 0 100 100 N/A 100 0 100 0 100 100 100 N/A 0 100 100 N/A 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 100 100 N/A 0 100 N/A 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 100
III 28
Is there independent external validation of internal 
controls of agencies in charge of receiving payments 
from resource companies?
LRF 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 0 100 N/A 100 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 N/A 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 N/A 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 100
III 29
Are payments by resource companies to the govern-
ment (either to the Ministry of the resource sector or 
other authorized agency) subject to an independent 
audit?
LRF 0 0 100 100 100 0 100 0 100 100 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 N/A 100 0 100 0
III 30 Does a Parliamentary committee scrutinize audit reports on resource-related revenues? LRF 0 0 0 67 0 0 100 0 100 0 33 N/A 0 0 0 33 100 N/A 100 67 100 33 0 100 100 0 100 100 0 67 0 N/A N/A N/A 67 0 0 0 33 0 0 0
III 31
Can civil society participate in oversight of revenue gen-
eration, through EITI committees, board meetings of the 
resource regulatory authority, or other mechanisms?
LRF 0 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 100 0 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 0 100 0 0 100 100 100 0 100 100 0 100 100 0 100 100 0 0 100 0 100 100
IV 32 If an SOC exists, does the SOC publish information about its operations? TR 1 67 0 67 33 33 100 100 100 100 100 N/A 100 0 N/A N/A 33 33 0 100 100 N/A 100 100 0 33 100 100 N/A 100 33 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 100 0 N/A 67 33 0
IV 33 Does the SOC follow internationally recognized  accounting standards? LRF 0 0 N/A 100 100 100 100 100
100 100 100 N/A 100 0 N/A N/A 0 0 0 100 100 N/A 100 100 0 N/A 100 100 N/A 100 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 0 N/A 100 0 0
IV 34 Are SOC reports audited, and are the audited reports published? TR 1 100 33 100 33 33 100 100 100 100 100 N/A 33 0 N/A N/A 33 33 33 100 100 N/A 33 100 0 33 100 100 N/A 100 0 N/A N/A 33 100 N/A 100 0 N/A 67 0 0
IV 35 Do SOC audits include consolidated accounts that cover all of the SOC subsidiaries? LRF 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 0 100 0 100 N/A 100 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 100 100 100 N/A 100 100 0 N/A 100 100 N/A 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 100 0 N/A
IV 36 Does the SOC publish information about quasi-fiscal activities? TR 1 33 0 100 0 0 100 0 100 33 67 N/A 0 0 N/A N/A 0 33 0 0 11 N/A 0 100 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 67 33 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 0 N/A N/A
IV 37 Does the Ministry of Finance publish the overall public sector balance including the SOC financial balance? TR 1 0 100 N/A 100 0 100 0 67 67 33 0 100 0 N/A N/A 67 0 67 0 0 N/A 67 67 0 0 N/A 0 N/A 0 0 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 100 0 N/A 67 100 N/A
IV 38
If there are joint ventures, does the government  
(Ministry of the sector or SOC) publish information  
on the SOC equity participation in joint ventures?
TR 1 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 N/A N/A 0 100 N/A 100 50 N/A 0 N/A 100 100 100 100 N/A 100 N/A N/A N/A 100 0 N/A 100 0 N/A 100 100 100
IV 39
Are government officials required to disclose  
information about their financial interest in any  
extractive activity or joint venture? 
TR 1 0 0 100 100 0 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 0 N/A 100 0 0 100 N/A 0 N/A 0 100 100 100 100 100 N/A 100 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 0 100 0 N/A 100 0 100
IV 40 Does the SOC publish information on the composition of its Board of Directors? TR 1 100 N/A 0 100 0 100 0 100 100 100 N/A 100 0 N/A N/A 100 100 100 100 100 N/A N/A 100 100 100 100 100 N/A 100 100 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A 100 0 N/A 100 0 0
V 41
If a resource fund exists, are the rules governing the 
fund publicly available? (This includes information 
on how the instrument is funded, as well as rules for 
disbursement.)
TR 1 0 0 100 N/A 0 N/A 0 100 N/A 100 N/A N/A 0 100 0 N/A 0 100 100 100 0 100 100 100 0 100 0 N/A 100 100 N/A N/A 100 N/A 100 100 0 100 0 N/A N/A
V 42
If a resource fund exists, does the fund management or 
authority in charge of the fund publish information on 
its assets and transactions?
TR 1 0 0 100 N/A 33 N/A 0 100 N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 67 0 N/A 33 67 67 0 0 N/A 67 0 0 100 N/A N/A 100 33 N/A N/A 33 N/A 100 100 0 67 67 N/A N/A
V 43 How often does the fund management or authority in charge of the fund publish these reports? TR 1 0 0 100 N/A 100 N/A 0 67 N/A 0 N/A N/A 0 0 0 N/A 33 100 100 0 0 N/A 100 0 0 100 N/A N/A 100 33 N/A N/A 67 N/A 100 67 0 33 33 N/A N/A
V 44 Are the fund financial reports audited, and are audited reports published? TR 1 0 0 100 N/A N/A N/A 0 100 N/A 33 N/A N/A 0 0 0 N/A 0 100 100 0 N/A N/A 100 0 0 100 N/A N/A 100 33 N/A N/A 0 N/A 100 100 0 100 33 N/A N/A
VI 45
Are arrangements for resource revenue sharing 
between central and sub-national governments set in 
legislation?
LRF 0 N/A 100 N/A 100 N/A 100 0 100 0 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 0 100 0 N/A N/A 0 100 100 100 N/A 100 100 100 N/A 100 100 100 0 N/A N/A 0 100 100 N/A 0
VI 46
Are the rules for revenue transfers from central to 
sub-national governments published, including the 
formula(s) for revenue sharing?
TR 1 N/A 0 N/A 100 N/A 100 0 100 0 100 100 100 0 0 N/A 100 0 100 0 N/A N/A 0 100 100 100 N/A 100 100 100 N/A 0 N/A 100 N/A N/A 0 0 100 100 N/A N/A
VI 47
Does the central government publish information on 
transfers of resource related revenues to Sub-national 
governments?
TR 1 N/A 0 N/A 100 N/A 100 0 0 0 100 0 100 0 0 N/A 100 0 100 0 N/A N/A 0 100 0 100 N/A 0 100 100 N/A 0 N/A 100 N/A N/A 0 0 100 100 N/A N/A
VI 48
How often does the central government publish 
information on transfers of resource related revenues to 
Sub-national governments?
TR 1 0 0 N/A 33 N/A 100 33 0 100 0 100 0 0 N/A 33 0 33 0 N/A N/A 0 100 0 100 N/A 0 100 100 N/A 0 N/A 33 N/A N/A 0 0 33 33 N/A N/A
VI 49 Is the information on transfers of resource related revenues comprehensive? TR 1 0 0 N/A 100 N/A 100 0 33 0 100 0 100 0 0 N/A 67 33 67 0 N/A N/A 100 0 100 N/A 0 100 100 N/A 33 N/A 100 N/A N/A 0 0 100 33 N/A N/A
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VI 50 Do Sub-national governments publish information on transfers received from central governments? TR 1 0 0 N/A 100 N/A 100 0 100 0 100 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 100 0 0 N/A 0 100 100 N/A 0 N/A 100 N/A N/A 0 0 100 100 N/A N/A
VII 51 Is this country an EITI candidate or compliant country? TR 1 0 0 100 0 0 0 67 0 0 0 67 0 0 67 67 0 0 33 67 0 100 0 0 67 67 67 0 67 0 0 100 0 0 33 67 0 0 0 0 33 33
VII 52 If this country has adopted EITI, has this country pub-lished an EITI report? TR 0 N/A N/A 67 N/A N/A N/A 33 N/A N/A N/A 33 N/A 100 67 100 N/A N/A 0 33 N/A 100 N/A N/A 67 67 67 N/A 67 N/A N/A 100 N/A N/A 0 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0
VII 53 In the EITI report, have all the payments and revenue been audited by an independent auditor? TR 0 N/A N/A 100 N/A N/A N/A 33 N/A N/A N/A 33 N/A 33 33 100 N/A N/A N/A 33 N/A 33 N/A N/A 67 100 100 N/A 67 N/A N/A 33 N/A N/A N/A 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
VII 54 In the EITI report, have all payments and revenue been reconciled by an independent administrator? TR 0 N/A N/A 67 N/A N/A N/A 67 N/A N/A N/A 100 N/A 100 100 100 N/A N/A N/A 100 N/A 100 N/A N/A 100 100 100 N/A 100 N/A N/A 100 N/A N/A N/A 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
VII 55 In the EITI report, is information about payments and revenue from state-owned companies included? TR 0 N/A N/A 100 N/A N/A N/A 100 N/A N/A N/A 100 N/A 100 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 100 100 N/A 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
revenue Watch index 22.8 34.7 75.1 56.3 46.3 97.0 41.8 80.6 42.2 79.6 22.5 73.6 11.6 41.8 32.3 50.0 36.1 63.8 77.5 29.8 60.5 48.4 83.4 38.2 46.5 96.4 51.1 76.8 89.7 32.4 38.2 58.0 37.4 27.8 70.5 61.9 9.7 71.4 63.0 60.5 41.2
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country
number of suggested 
changes by peer reviewer
number of questions changed 
after peer and internal review 
Algeria 0 0
Angola 2 1
Azerbaijan 22 21
Bolivia 7 7
Botswana 3 1
Brazil 11 6
Cameroon 8 11
Chile 3 8
China 5 4
Colombia 15 15
DRC 4 4
Ecuador 7 1
Equatorial Guinea 10 7
Gabon 0 8
Ghana 11 10
Indonesia 6 4
Iran 3 5
Iraq 0 0
Kazakhstan 16 14
Kuwait 6 5
Liberia 6 12
Malaysia 11 11
Mexico 9 4
Mongolia 21 25
Nigeria 14 15
Norway 10 9
Papua New Guinea 0 0
Peru 1 2
Russia 10 4
Saudi Arabia 15 9
Sierra Leone 4 3
South Africa 0 10
Sudan 0 0
Tanzania 6 1
Timor-Leste 8 8
Trinidad and Tobago 7 3
Turkmenistan 8 3
United States 9 8
Venezuela 27 24
Yemen 3 1
Zambia 5 0
annual or in-year report – document published each year (annual) 
or quarterly or monthly (in-year), often by the ministry of the extrac-
tive sector, the central bank, or the resource companies, describing 
their activities and operations with regards to the extractive industry. 
auditor’s report – either an annual report issued by the Supreme 
Audit Institution attesting to the government agencies’ year-end final 
accounts, or a report from an internal or external audit agency that 
provides audited financial statements. 
contract – agreement between a state or any of the authorized 
agencies acting on its behalf and resource companies that regulates 
access to resources. We do not include procurement contracts for 
goods and services used in resource companies’ operations. 
extractive industries Transparency initiative (eiTi) – a global 
standard that promotes revenue transparency that has a method-
ology for monitoring and reconciling company payments and govern-
ment revenues at the country level. Participants from governments, 
companies and national civil society groups oversee the process.
eiTi report – document that discusses a country’s compliance 
with the standards and guidelines of the Extractive Industries  
Transparency Initiative (EITI). The report is produced periodically 
by a commission composed of representatives from the range of 
extractive-industry stakeholders in the country.  
environmental and social impact reports – documents, which 
governments may require resource companies to prepare, that 
analyze the side effects of resource extraction on the surrounding 
communities and environment.
Foreign direct investment (Fdi) – according to the International 
Monetary Fund, FDI is “[t]he acquisition of at least ten percent of the 
ordinary shares or voting power in a public or private enterprise by 
nonresident investors. Direct investment involves a lasting interest in the 
management of an enterprise and includes reinvestment of profits.”
Freedom of information laws – legislation specifying how citizens 
can obtain documents and data held by the state, as well as the  
limited exceptions a government can use to deny citizens’ requests. 
Generally accepted accounting principles – uniform minimum 
standards and guidelines to financial accounting and reporting.
Generally accepted principles and practices (Gapp or santiago 
principles) – a set of voluntary principles and practices for the 
good governance of sovereign wealth funds agreed upon by the 
International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds in 2008. 
Group of Twenty (G20) – a group of countries established in 
1999 to bring together systemically important industrialized and 
developing economies to discuss key issues in the global economy.
international Financial reporting standards – a set of financial 
reporting standards adopted by the International Accounting  
Standards Board.
imF Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency – published in 
October 2007, the guide tailors the International Monetary Fund’s 
Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency to the specific needs 
of resource-rich countries. The guide identifies a set of 130 practices, 
grouped into four pillars: clarity of roles and responsibilities; open 
budget process; public availability of information; and assurances  
of integrity.
license – an agreement between an international company and 
a host government concerning a specific geographical area and  
operations related to exploitation of natural resources.
petroleum, gas and mining statistical reports or databases – 
periodically updated data sources produced and published by  
the ministry of the extractive sector, statistical agencies, regulatory 
agencies or by the state-owned company.
production sharing contracts (pscs) – agreements in which the 
contractor bears exploration costs and risks for development and 
production, in exchange for a share of the resulting production.
publicly available information – information that any and all 
citizens might be able to obtain, either through a request to the  
public authority issuing the document or on the Internet.  
pWyp – Publish What You Pay, a global civil society coalition that 
helps citizens of resource-rich developing countries hold their  
governments accountable for the management of revenues from  
the oil, gas and mining industries. 
resource wealth – both the reserves of and the revenue deriving 
from the extraction of oil, gas and minerals.
santiago principles – see Generally accepted principles and prac-
tices (GAPP)
special resource funds – also referred to as “stabilization funds,” 
“savings funds,” or “future generations’ funds,” special resource 
funds are separate accounts set up by the government that are 
funded exclusively by natural resource revenues. They are designed 
to accumulate revenue when times are good; stabilize public spend-
ing; and finance public spending after the resources have been 
exhausted, thereby mitigating some of the negative consequences 
associated with natural resource dependence. 
sub-national transfers – in intergovernmental fiscal relations, 
sub-national transfers are payments from the central or national  
government to state, provincial, regional or local governments.
subsoil natural resources – resources found underground below the
topsoil.  With the notable exception of the United States, subsoil re- 
sources typically belong to the state, not the owner of the land above.
Appendix 3: 
number of changes adopted during review process
Glossary of Terms
52 53
Revenue Watch Institute / Transparency International
1 EITI Fact Sheet: http://eiti.org/document/factsheet 
2 See World Energy Outlook (2008).
3  Numerous explanations exist for this “paradox of plenty.” Among the best-known is 
the so-called “Dutch disease,” or the fact that the inflow of mineral and petroleum 
revenues tend to appreciate real exchange rates, which makes it cheaper to import 
rather than produce local goods; this resulting concentration of the economy on 
extractive activities is detrimental to the rest of the economy (Sachs and Warner, 
2001). Volatility also presents countries with the challenge of preparing budgets 
closely tied to wildly fluctuating commodities, whose prices often crash around 
times of crisis, leading to revenue collapse and pushing governments into dire 
straits (Gelb, 1988). Moreover, extractive industries are easier to tax than individual 
income, and they provide incentives for state capture by elites interested in siphon-
ing away revenue (Karl, 1997). Natural resources also generate “rentier” effects by 
which governments can use low tax rates and high spending to alleviate pressures 
for democracy, thereby fostering conditions for corruption and lack of account-
ability, especially under conditions of high inequality (Dunning, 2008; Ross, 2009). 
Additionally, recent research has shown that the “nontax” nature of commodity 
revenues tends to reinsure the stability of existing authoritarian regimes (Morrison, 
2009). In terms of conflict, academic work has extensively proved how natural 
resources can play a major role in fueling civil war (Bannon and Collier, 2003; 
Humphreys, 2005; Ross, 2003). At the same time, there is a growing literature 
suggesting that by improving the quality of institutions, enforcing the rule of law, 
strengthening accountability and controlling corruption, countries can keep the po-
tential negative effects of the extractive industries in check. Good governance and 
management practices have allowed countries such as Australia, Botswana, Canada, 
Chile and Norway to benefit from resource wealth (Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz, 
2007; Sala-i-Martin, 2003; IMF, 2007)
4  See Charlie Savage, “Sex, Drug Use and Graft Cited in Interior Department,”  
New York Times, Sept. 10, 2008 (www.nytimes.com/2008/09/11/
washington/11royalty.html).
5 Islam (2006).
6 Hameed (2005).
7 Kurtzman and Yago (2007).
8  The IMF produced a guide for resource revenue transparency in 2005 that was 
updated in 2007 and included in the IMF’s Reports on Observance of Standards and 
Codes. Yet, no systematic effort has been made to measure revenue transparency on 
a comparative basis.
9  These include questions 1 to 4, 10 to 24, 26, 32, 34, 36 to 44, and 46 to 51 of the 
Revenue Watch Index questionnaire.
10  The IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department applied the principles of the Code of Good 
Practices on Fiscal Transparency (2007) and Manual on Fiscal Transparency (2007) 
to the problems faced by resource-rich countries. The four organizing principles  
of these practices are: clarity of roles and responsibilities; open budget process; 
public availability of information; and assurances of integrity. The IMF approach  
is to comment on the transparency of institutional arrangements and not to  
identify the optimal ones. For the text of the Natural Resource Charter, see  
www.naturalresourcecharter.org.
11  On this issue Calder and McPherson (2008) suggest that a clear definition of roles 
and authority will increase transparency, that separation of roles between regulator 
and licensing agencies will reduce conflict of interests, and that it can also minimize 
coordination problems among departments involved in managing revenue flows.
12  For three of the petroleum producers—Brazil, China and the United States— this 
resource is not their main source of fiscal income; furthermore, for the United States 
the research reviews only the federal administration of the Gulf of Mexico. However, 
the index includes these countries because their management of extractive indus-
tries offers valuable lessons for other countries. In the case of mining countries, 
this research follows the IMF guide to decide the resource target: for Botswana, 
diamonds; Chile, copper; DRC, diamonds; Ghana, gold; Liberia, diamonds; Mongolia, 
copper and gold; Peru, gold, copper and silver; Sierra Leone, diamonds; South 
Africa, gold; Tanzania, gold and diamonds; and Zambia, copper.
13  We were unable to find local peer reviewers in eight countries: China, DRC, Gabon, 
Iraq, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. For those countries, we 
use results that went through an internal review for fact-checking and methodologi-
cal consistency.
14  In addition to avoiding repetition of information, we do not want to reward multiple 
publications of information and thus implicitly favoring redundant reporting. Also, 
taking the highest score for each indicator in this section recognizes the fact that oil, 
gas and mining sectors are commonly managed by different ministries and agencies 
in charge of different roles. Therefore, one should expect agencies to provide better 
information on the subject directly under their authority. 
15  The assignment of a given numerical score for a given answer is a function of the 
number of choices, across which the assignment of points is divided evenly. For a 
yes/no question, a “yes” is equal to 100 points and a “no” to 0 points. For multiple-
choice questions, the top choice “A” equals 100 points; the next “B”, 67 points; “C”, 
33 points; and “D” with 0 points. All questions have “not applicable” as an option  
which drops the question from consideration in determining that country’s score.
16  For more information on EITI reports, see http://eiti.org/document/eitireports 
17  See, for instance, the Lima Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing Precepts, the UN 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) or the OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.
18  For detailed standards on the reports that SAIs should produce, refer to the Lima 
Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing Precepts developed by the International  
Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI). See www.intosai.org/en/ 
portal/documents/intosai/general/lima_declaration/.
19  Despite providing information about contracts, a number of countries were exclud-
ed from this category due to the type of data made available. For instance, certain 
countries, like Venezuela, provide information about contracting and procurement 
opportunities but not about the final agreements. In other countries, like Ecuador, 
even if contracts are publicly available their validity is subject to discussion (see 
note 25). In Azerbaijan and Ghana, companies operating in the country publish con-
tracts and environmental impact reports. However, the latter are not counted here 
as disclosed by the government. Mongolia and Ghana published a number of mining 
investment agreements after December 2009, thereby falling beyond the temporal 
scope of the index’s research, and their recent disclosure will be taken into account 
in future studies. DRC has disclosed numerous mining investment agreements for 
review, but we do not take this into consideration because the public availability 
of these remains limited. Finally, eight countries were considered “not applicable/
other” cases in Table 2, given that they disclose certain parts of the agreements 
(like negotiation terms, for instance), but they do not publish the full text of the 
contracts.  
20 There was one “not applicable/other” case.
21  See the RWI publication Contracts Confidential: Ending Secret Deals in the Extractive 
Industries, available at www.revenuewatch.org/news/publications/contracts-confi-
dential-ending-secret-deals-extractive-industries.
22  See, for instance, “Venezuela, Fiscal Transparency,” in Oxford Analytica, 
December 2006, available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/investments/ 
assets/equities/international/permissible-2007/venezuela-fiscal-report-2006.pdf  
Research for the Oxford Analytica paper was conducted in 2006. Further research on 
the topic would probably be needed.
 23  However, the accuracy of the oil figures that the government provided has been 
put into question by a recent Global Witness report. See Fueling Mistrust, A report 
by Global Witness, September 2009: www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.
php/804/en/fuelling_mistrust_the_need_for_transparency_in_sud   
24 See note 21. 
25  Ecuador has also published its contracts. However, a lengthy renegotiation process 
that started in 2007 to turn all previous petroleum-sharing agreements into service 
agreements has created legal uncertainty about the validity of the published 
contracts, while the contents of new agreement remained unknown at the time of 
research. At the same time, legislation approved in 2009 allows the government 
to enter into strategic agreements with SOCs that appear to be excluded from the 
obligation to disclose under Ecuador’s Freedom of Information and Access to Infor-
mation Law.
26  This standard is based on a number of regional agreements requiring publication of 
environmental and social impact reports for country signatories, and on the fact that 
these reports are required for all extractive projects financed by the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC). For instance, the Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters, best known as the Aarhus Convention, was adopted in June 1998 by the 
“Environment for Europe” process. This convention recognizes the need of govern-
ment accountability on environmental protection. Also, the Global Reporting Initia-
tive, a multi-stakeholder group, has been developing special guidance on reporting 
social and environmental impacts for the the oil, gas and mining industry. For more 
information, see www.globalreporting.org. 
27  The section is the most important component of the index based on the number of 
indicators (29 indicators compared with 22 for all the other sections combined), 
and it stresses the importance of this topic for revenue transparency. As mentioned 
in the methodological section, for this section we developed a single table per coun-
try, choosing the highest score for each sub-indicator and dropping from the score 
all indicators that were not relevant to evaluate the country’s particular system. 
28  See Section II, sub-questions a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h and i, of the Revenue Watch Index 
questionnaire.
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cal Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
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Research Publication/Oxford University Press, 1988.
Guide on resource revenue Transparency, International 
Monetary Fund, October 2007, www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/
eng/051507g.pdf
hameed, Farhan, “Fiscal Transparency and Economic Outcomes,” 
IMF Working Paper, Fiscal Affairs Department, December 2005.
humphreys, macartan, “Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict 
Resolution,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49, no. 4 (August 2005): 
508-37.
humpreys, macartan, Jeffrey d. sachs, and Joseph e. stiglitz, 
Escaping the Resource Curse. New York: Columbia University Press, 
2007. 
islam, roumeen, “Do more transparent governments govern bet-
ter?” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3077, June 2003. 
Karl, Terry lynn, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. 
Kurtzman, Joel, and Glenn yago, Global Edge: Using the Opacity 
Index to Manage the Risk of Cross-Border Business. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard Business School Press, 2007. 
manual on Fiscal Transparency, International Monetary Fund, 
2007, www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/051507m.pdf 
morrison, Kevin m., “Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional 
Foundations of Regime Stability,” International Organization, 63 
(2009), 107-38.
ross, michael l., “Oil and Democracy Revisited,” working paper, 
March 2009, www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/Oilper-
cent20andpercent20Democracypercent20Revisited.pdf 
-------, “A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil War,” Annual Review 
of Political Science, 9 (2006): 265–300.
sachs, Jeffrey, and andrew Warner, “Natural Resources and 
Economic Development: the Curse of Natural Resources,” European 
Economic Review, 45 (2001): 827-38.
sala-i-martin, Xavier, and arvind subramanian, “Addressing the 
Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria.” IMF Working 
No. 03/139, 2003.
Thurber, mark, david hults, and patrick heller, “The Limits 
of Institutional Design in Oil Sector Governance: Exporting the 
‘Norwegian Model,’” Program on Energy and Sustainable Develop-
ment, Stanford University, February 2010, http://pesd.stanford.edu/
publications/the_limits_of_institutional_design_in_oil_sector_gover-
nance_exporting_the_norwegian_model/
Truman, edwin m., “Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Need for Greater 
Transparency and Accountability,” Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, Policy Brief 07-6, 2007, www.iie.com/publications/pb/
pb07-6.pdf
World energy outlook, International Energy Agency, OECD/IEA, 
2008. 
references endnotes
54 55
Revenue Watch Institute / Transparency International
acknowledgements
Juan Carlos Quiroz, policy analyst at the Revenue Watch 
Institute, coordinated the research underlying this report 
and the drafting of the text. Antonio Barroso, Andrea 
Borde, Ruth Carlitz and Rebecca Morse provided crucial 
support for the planning, research, fact-checking and 
drafting. Country researchers and peer-reviewers  
are too numerous to be listed, but their commitment  
was a crucial contribution. 
This report also benefitted from the counsel of François 
Valerian of Transparency International; Warren Krafchik, 
Elena Mondo and Vivek Ramkumar of the International 
Budget Partnership; Nathaniel Heller of Global Integrity; 
and Anton Op de Beke of the International Monetary 
Fund. Our appreciation also goes to members of the  
RWI Board who provided advice and comments, espe-
cially Alan Detheridge, Karina Litvack, Julie McCarthy,  
Willie Olsen and Michael Ross. RWI staff contributed 
critical knowledge at every step of this project, and  
special thanks go to Antoine Heuty, deputy director,  
for his support. 
photography
Cover, George Osodi/Panos Pictures: The Kårstø 
gas and oil processing plant of Norway’s Statoil.
Page 8, Qilai Shen/Panos Pictures: Coal depot 
in Shanghai, China.
Page 18, Ed Kashi/VII: A cleanup worker at an 
abandoned well in Oloibiri in Nigeria’s Bayelsa State. 
(photo illustration)
design
Michael Wiemeyer | Designlounge, Inc.
This report is printed on 100% post-consumer 
waste recycled paper. 
29  See “Gabon to launch national oil company by year-end”, Reuters, April 22, 2010,  
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE63L2ID20100422  
30  Peru and South Africa were excluded from scores for SOCs’ operations; yet they do 
have ownership interests in companies operating in extractive ventures.
31 See note 22.
32  The LWCF receives funds from congressional appropriations, and since 2009 it 
has been supplemented by revenues from certain oil and gas leases in the Gulf of 
Mexico.
33  Santiago Principles for Sovereign Wealth Funds. See www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/gapplist.
htm and Truman (2007). 
34  Countries with centralized administrations and no sub-national transfers of extrac-
tive revenue were dropped from this evaluation. Research also avoided scoring 
countries where all fiscal (tax and nontax) revenue go to a central budget and then 
is distributed to local governments. The rationale for this is that indicators such as 
the Open Budget Index already cover the transparency of budgetary processes and 
anyone interested in this topic can consult those results for relevant resource-abun-
dant countries. 
35  For a critique of EITI reports on Cameroon and Gabon and their limitations, see 
Publish What You Pay reports available at www.publishwhatyoupay.org. 
36  It should be noted that in the case of Venezuela, the division of roles between the 
SOC and the ministry of the extractive sector is not clear-cut (e.g. the president of 
Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. is also the minister for Oil and Energy), and therefore 
the distinction between institutional actors in relation to management of licensing 
procedures might not be relevant. 
37 See Thurber, Hults and Heller (2010).
38  See “BP Statistical Review of World Energy,” www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/
globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_re-
view_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2010_downloads/statistical_review_of_world_
energy_full_report_2010.pdf. 
39  For the purposes of the analysis, the Latin America region excludes Mexico and 
Chile, which are included under the OECD regional grouping.
40  Interestingly for Latin America, the research process highlighted a negative effect 
of political instability on revenue transparency. There are two examples of this: in 
Bolivia the government removed previously published contracts with oil and gas 
companies from official websites early in 2010. Similarly, in Ecuador an ongoing 
process to modify production-sharing contracts into service agreements has resulted 
in contracts published by Petroecuador, which appear invalid while there are still no 
new agreements in place.
41  See “U.S. Financial Reform Sets New Standard for Energy and Mining Industry 
Transparency”, Revenue Watch Institute, July 15, 2010, www.revenuewatch.org/
news/news-article/united-states/us-financial-reform-sets-new-standard-energy-and-
mining-industry-tra. 
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